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Summary  findings
The buildup of vulnerabilities in East Asia is shown here  Domestic weaknesses were aggravated by poorly
to be mainly the result of weaknesses in financial  disciplined foreign lending. The problem was not so
intermediation, poor corporate governance, and deficient  much overall indebtedness as the composition of debt: a
government policies, including pro-cyclical  buildup of short-term unhedged debt left the economies
macroeconomic policy responses to large capital inflows.  vulnerable to a sudden loss of confidence.
Weak due diligence by external creditors,  fueled partly  The same factors made the crisis's economic and social
by ample global liquidity, also played a role but global  impact more severe than some anticipated. The loss of
factors were more important in triggering the crises than  confidence directly affected private demand - both
in causing them.  investment and consumption - which could not be
The crisis occurred partly because the economies  offset in the short run by net external demand.
lacked the institutional and regulatory structure to cope  The effect on corporations and financial institutions
with increasingly integrated capital markets. Trouble  has been severe because of the high degree of leveraging
arose from private sector decisions (by both borrowers  and the unhediged, short-term nature of foreign
and lenders) but governments created incentives for risky  liabilities, which has led to a severe liquidity crunch.
behavior and exerted little regulatory authority.  Domestic recession, financial and corporate distress,
Governments failed to encourage the transparency  liquidity const-raints,  and political uncertainty were self-
needed for the market to recognize and correct such  reinforcing, leading to a severe downturn.
problems as unreported  mutual guarantees, insider
relations, and nondisclosure of banks' and companies'
true net positions.
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Recent  events in East Asia have highlighted the risks of financial structures in  a  financially
integrated world.  This  paper documents that the buildup of vulnerabilities in East Asia was
mainly the result of weaknesses in domestic financial intermediation, poor corporate governance,
and deficient government  policies,  including poor macro-economic policy  responses to  large
capital inflows.  Weak  due  diligence  by  external creditors,  in  part  fueled by  ample  global
liquidity, also played a role in building up vulnerabilities, but g lobal factors were more important
in triggering the crises than in causing them.  In spite of these policies and weaknesses, we argue,
however, that for most East Asian countries a large financial crisis was not "inevitable," but was
mainly triggered by spillovers from nearby countries.  Differences between countries, both  in
degree of vulnerability and depth of crisis, support this conclusion.  The paper concludes with
some lessons for other countries.
Paper presented at the PAFTAD 24 conference, "Asia Pacific Financial Liberalization and  Reform", May 20-22,
1998, Chiangmai, Thailand, hosted by School of Development Economics, NIDA, in collaboration with PAFTAD
International Steering Committee. This paper has really been a group effort.  We would like to thank Jos Jansen and
Peter Montiel for very useful contributions,  Sergio Schmukler for his insights, Michael Dooley, the  discussant,
Akira Kohsaka, and seminars participants for comments, and the PAFTAO steering committee for guidance. This
paper  draws  on  and  extends  the  analysis  in the  joint-World  Bank-ADB  study:  Managing  Global  Financial
Integration  In  Asia:  Emerging  Lessons  and  Prospective  Challenges, March  10-12,  1998,  for  comments.  The
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank or of the Central Bank of Chile.I.  Introduction
Private capital flows to developing countries increased six-fold over the years 1990-1996.
These large inflows are not simply an independent and isolated macroeconomic shock for these
countries  to  manage.  They are rather the manifestation  of a  structural change  in the  world
economic environment, in the form of a transition by many coumtries  from near financial autarky
to fairly close integration with world capital markets.  The capital inflow phenomenon, and the
associated need to address the potential macroeconomic overheating, were the direct products of
the transition between these polar financial integration regimes.  In the new, more integrated
environment, however, capital could potentially flow out as well as in.  Key challenges facing
newly financially integrated countries concern not just  how lo manage large inflows, but  also
how to reduce vulnerability to the potentially disruptive effects of sudden and massive capital
outflows.
Countries in East Asia were at the forefront of the worldwide movement toward increased
financial integration (see World Bank,  1997). East Asian countries fared quite well during the
initial  inflow stage of this  financial integration process, especially  in coimparison with  many
countries outside the region. Indeed, in many ways lessons to be applied elsewhere regarding the
appropriate adjustment to large capital inflows have been drawn from the experiences of East
Asia. Countries in the region also weathered the storm associated with the Mexican  currency
crisis  of December  1994 in relatively good form, suggesting that the policies  they adopted to
manage inflows also proved effective in rendering these econoimies  relatively less vulnerable to a
financial shock that created serious disruptions elsewhere.
Nonetheless, in the summer of 1997 it became evident that this view could no longer be
sustained.  The crisis that struck Thailand and the rapidity withi  which it spread to other countries
in  East Asia,  suggested that all was not well. The extent  of the subsequent fallout  has been
surprisingly  large  and  the  crisis  has  also  been  deeper  and  more  protracted than  many  had
anticipated.  The issues that arise in connection with the crisis are first and foremost to examine
what went wrong, and second to determine what policy implications the currency crisis  holds.
Was  East Asia  inevitably doomed to  undergo the crisis?  Or was it mainly  due to  its  rapid
financial  integration and the  functioning of global  financial markets?  The answers to  these
questions matter, of course, not just  for the design of future policies in countries in East Asia
afflicted by the new crisis, but also for countries elsewhere that more recently have embarked on
the road to financial integration.
This  paper  examines  the  factors that  led to  the  proximate  causes  of  the  crisis,  the
spillovers, and the depth of the crisis.  It then draws some irnplications for the immediate and
longer-term agenda in managing financial integration.  In section 2, we provide an overview of
capital flows and macroeconomic developments in the region.  This way we set the stage for a
discussion  of  the  factors  and  processes  that  made  countries  vulnerable  and  the  buildup  of
vulnerabilities in section 3.  Section 4 discusses the evolution of the crisis and the spillovers, and
why the crisis  has been  so protracted.  Section 5  focuses  on the  immediate  agenda  in  the
aftermath of the crisis and explores the medium-term policy agenda.
2II.  Overview  of Capital  Flows  and Macroeconomic  Developments
Magnitude and Composition of Capital Inflows.  Table II.1 shows that  East Asia  led
the developing world  in the resurgence of private capital flows in the late  1980s.  It quickly
emerged as the most important destination for private capital flows and its share of total capital
flows to developing countries increased from  12% in the early 1980s to 43% during the 1990s.
During this period, the composition of flows to East Asian countries also changed.  In the second
half of the 1980s, commercial bank lending was replaced by FDI.  In recent years, portfolio flows
(both  bond  and  equity) expanded  rapidly as  did  short-term borrowing  (see  Table  11.1), and
portfolio  flows  amounted  to  3.4%  of  GDP  during  1993-96, and  short-term  borrowing  an
additional 2.3% of GDP.  Whereas the dominant role of FDI distinguished East Asia from Latin
America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the more recent period borrowing was much more
skewed towards short-term flows than was the case for Latin America.
Another important characteristic of private capital flows to East Asia was that, unlike
Latin America, it was preceded rather than followed by a surge in investment (Table II. 1).  In the
second half of the 1  980s and the early 1  990s, the bulk of the increase in investment was financed
by a corresponding increase in national savings (Figure II.1).  During the more recent period,
however,  a  much  higher  fraction  of  the  increase  in  investment  was  financed  abroad.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of private capital flows was much higher than the amount of foreign
savings absorbed leading to  substantial reserve accumulation (see Figure 11.1) and  associated
with  some private sector capital outflows. There was considerable variation, however,  at the
individual  country  level:  Malaysia  and  Thailand  received the  largest  magnitude  of  capital
inflows, in excess of 30% of GDP; the Philippines also received substantial inflows during 1993-
96; but Korea did not receive more than 15% of GDP.
3Table 11.1 Magnitude and Composition of Capital Inflows
(% of GDP)
East Asia  ASEAN-4
85-88  89-92  93-96  85-88  89-92  93-96
Net long-term capital flows  1.4  3.0  6.2  2.0  4.8  6.9
-Net official flows  0.4  0.6  0.4  1.2  1.3  0.4
-Net private flows  1.0  2.4  5.8  0.8  3.5  6.6
Bank/trade lending  0.0  0.7  0.7  -0.3  0.9  0.8
Portfolio bond  0.3  0.1  1.0  0.2  -0.1  1.4
FDI  0.7  1.3  3.0  0.9  2.3  2.4
Portfolio equity  0.0  0.2  1.1  0.1  0.4  2.0
IMF credit  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0
Other private flows  -0.4  -0.5  -1.9  0.3  2.0  -0.1
of which: short-term debt  0.2  0.7  0.9  0.1  2.0  2.3
South Asia  LAC
85-88  89-92  93-96  85-88  89-92  93-96
Net long-term capital flows  2.2  1.9  2.6  1.3  1.7  4.3
- Net official flows  0.9  1.1  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.0
- Net private flows  1.3  0.8  2.1  0.8  1.4  4.4
Bank/trade lending  1.1  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.0  0.5
Portfolio bond  0.1  0.2  0.0  -0.2  0.2  1.2
FDI  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.6
Portfolio equity  0.0  0.1  1.1  0.0  0.3  1.1
IMF credit  -0.4  0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
Other private flows  0.0  0.3  0.6  -0.7  0.7  -1.0
of which: short-term debt  0.4  0.1  -0.2  -0.1  0.7  0.6
4Table 11.2 Investment,  Savings  and Capital  Flows
(% of GDP)
East Asia  ASEAN-4
85-88  89-92  93-96  85-88  89-92  93-96
Investment  32.1  34.9  38.2  25.7  32.6  35.0
National Savings  31.6  34.0  36.1  23.9  28.6  30.3
- Private  24.5  28.3  30.2  13.2  20.0  20.4
- Public  4.8  5.8  5.9  3.3
Current Account Deficit  0.2  0.8  1.9  1.1  3.8  4.6
Total Capital Inflows  0.6  1.9  3.9  2.2  6.7  6.8
Reserve Accumulation  0.7  1.6  2.3  1.0  2.9  2.2
South Asia  LAC
85-88  89-92  93-96  85-88  89-92  93-96
Investment  21.9  23.6  23.6  20.5  20.6  20.1
National Savings  19.8  21.2  21.9  20.6  19.6  17.6
- Private  18.4  20.2  20.9  16.5  16.2  15.1
- Public  1.4  1.0  1.0  4.1  3.3  2.5
Current Account Deficit  2.3  2.3  1.7  1.0  1.1  2.4
Total Capital Inflows  1.9  2.4  3.0  0.7  2.4  3.5
Reserve Accumulation  -0.4  0.1  1.3  -0.3  1.3  1.0
5Figure II.1 Trends of Investment, Savings, Current Account Deficits,
Reserve Accumulation and Private Capital Inflows
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Macroeconomic  Policies  During  the  Early  Inflow  Period.  The  macroeconomic
strategy in East Asian countries during the early inflow period had two characteristics. First, an
exchange rate regime oriented toward enhanced competitiveness, i.e., the achievement of a real
exchange rate target to complement the outward orientation embodied in structural policies.  This
policy was implemented through step devaluations in the currencies of several countries in the
region during the mid-1980s, followed in some countries by continuous depreciation, in some
cases more than offsetting the differential between domestic and foreign inflation.  In East Asia,
therefore,  unlike  in  many  countries  of  South  America, nominal  exchange  rate  management
during the capital inflow episode was not primarily devoted to the establishment of a nominal
anchor.  This exchange rate policy indeed seems to have been relatively successful in avoiding
currency overvaluation over the decade spanning the mid-80s to the mid-90s.
The second macroeconomic component was the adoption of a tight medium-term stance
for fiscal policy.  Overall public sector budgets in the region, which had exhibited deficits not out
of line with those which characterized other middle-income developing countries at the same
time, moved steadily into surplus after mid-eighties.  As the economies of these countries grew
and the tight  fiscal stance restrained  and at times reversed the  growth of public-sector debt,
public-sector debt-to-GDP ratios fell throughout the region, which coincided with the arrival of
capital inflows. By the mid-1990's,  several countries in East Asia had achieved sizable fiscal
surpluses and ratios of debt to GDP substantially below those of many industrial countries.  This
fiscal  stance also  promoted the depreciation  of the  long-run equilibrium  real exchange  rate,
which favored not only tradable goods relative to nontradables, but also prevented the emergence
of exchange rate misalignment in the form of undervaluation of the domestic currency.
Overall, then, the macroeconomic policy mix pursued can be  characterized as  one in
which the nominal exchange rate was assigned to a competitiveness objective, while fiscal policy
was assigned the objective  of price level stabilization. Other policies,  of both  structural  and
stabilization dimensions, that were being pursued simultaneously, however, turned out to have
important implications for subsequent events. On the structural side, the economies of East Asia
continued the process of liberalization that had begun in the mid-80s. Trade liberalization, capital
account  liberalization,  and especially financial  sector liberalization, all proceeded  during  the
inflow period.  On the stabilization side, countries placed heavy reliance on monetary policy as a
short-run stabilization instrument, varying the intensity of sterilized intervention in the foreign
exchange market in accordance with domestic macroeconomic needs.
7This mix of structural and macroeconomic policies proved at once attractive to foreign
capital-and  thus  was associated with  large capital  inflows--and,  in  combination with  tight
monetary  policy,  was  largely  successful  in  preventing  the  emergency  of  macroeconomic
overheating, at least early in the inflow period.  Most importantly, across countries an important
correlation  existed  during the  capital-inflow period between the avoidance  of excessive  real
exchange rate appreciation and a mix of aggregate demand oriented toward investment rather
than consumption  (Table 11.3).  This  link can be  interpreted naturally as the outcome  of the
policy  mix  undertaken.  Since the  effects  of tight  money tend to  fall  disproportionately  on
investment, an outward-oriented strategy in which tight fiscal policy supports a depreciated real
exchange  rate  exerts a  systematic effect on  the  compositionl of  aggregate  demand  favoring
investment over consumption.
Table 11.3 Disposition of Capital Inflows during Inflow Episodes
(%  of GDP, except for columns 7 and 8 which are in percent)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Net  Net  Current  Change in  Change in
Inflow  Private  Official  Account  Reserve  current  reserve
Country  Period  Inflows  inflows  Deficit  Accum.  Account  Accum.
East Asia
China  1993-96  2.65  0.35  1.04  1.96  34.7  65.3
India  1992-96  1.03  -0.58  -1.05  1.51  -231.1  331.1
Indonesia  1990-96  2.22  -1.08  0.14  1.00  12.2  87.8
Korea  1991-96  5.10  0.59  6.17  -0.48  108.5  -8.5
Malaysia  1989-96  8.08  0.11  6.05  .2.14  7:3.9  26.1
Pakistan  1992-96  2.60  0.31  1.90  1.00  65.4  34.6
Philippines  1990-96  5.38  -0.65  3.37  1.36  71.3  28.7
Thailand  1988-96  6.72  -1.19  2.81  .2.72  50.8  49.2
Other countries
Argentina  1991-94  2.13  0.11  1.03  1.21  45.9  54.1
Brazil  1992-96  2.65  -0.01  0.80  1.84  30.5  69.5
Chile  1989-96  1.46  -3.38  -4.19  2.28  219.3  -119.3
Colombia  1992-96  5.20  -0.83  4.81  -.0.44  110.0  -10.0
Mexico  1989-95  4.93  0.46  5.03  0.37  93.2  6.8
Peru  1990-96  4.75  0.04  2.11  2.68  44.0  56.0
Columns 3-6:  average during inflow period minus average during the immediately preceding
5-year period.
Column 5:  a minus sign means an improvement in the current account balance.
Column 6:  a minus sign means a decrease in reserve accumulation.
Column 7:  column 5 as a percentage of the sum of columns 3 and 4.
Column 8:  column 6 as a percentage of the sum of columns 3 and 4.
Source:  World Bank data; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
8Reversal  in Capital  Flows.  The financial  crisis  has led to a sharp reversal of net private
capital flow, since mid-1997 to East Asian countries, both on account of foreign lenders and
domestic  corporates. Whereas  new international  lending  fell sharply  in the second  half of 1997,
the main source of the tumaround in private capital flows was the reluctance  of international
banks to roll over the large volumes of short-term  debt and the push by domestic corporates  to
cover their unhedged  positions. By the fourth  quarter  of 1997,  new intemational  bond issues and
loan commitments  were 60% lower than the corresponding  period of  1996.  Altogether net
private capital flows to  the  five countries most affected by  the  crisis-Korea,  Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines  and Thailand-are  estimated to be more than $100 billion less in 1997
than in 1996,  and all of that decline  took place in the second  half of 1997  (World  Bank, 1998).
III.  What Caused the Crisis?
There are two important  questions  regarding  the East Asia financial  crisis: first, why did
the crisis occur;  and, second,  why  has the crisis  been so protracted. There are many explanations
and typologies that have been put forward  to explain the financial  crisis in East Asia. Corsetti,
Pesenti,  and Roubini, 1998,  Feldstein,  1998,  IMF, 1997,  Krugman,  1998,  and Radelet  and Sachs,
1998a and 1998b, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996, among others, provide typologies of
different types of financial  crises that may be applicable  to East Asia.  Box III.1 presents the
typology  of financial  crises  as identified  by Radelet  and Sachs (1998a).
Box 111.1  Types of Financial  Crises
Radelet  and Sachs, 1998a,  provide  the following  typology  of financial  crises:
1.  Macro-economic  policy  induced:  basically,  the financial  crisis  is the result of the pursuit  of a set of inconsistent
macro-economic  policies. This includes  the case of a Krugman  (1979)  type balance  of payment  crisis, where
the exchange  rate collapses  as domestic  credit  expansion  by the central  bank is inconsistent  with the exchange
rate  target,  as well as the type of self-fulfilling  crises of Obstfeld,  1986  and 1996. This  explanation  presumably
also includes  the presence  of some structural  weaknesses  (e.g., declines  in competitiveness  as a result of poor
labor  upgrading,  weak financial  systems)  which  make  macro-policies  more likely  inconsistent  to begin with.
2.  Financial  panic: the country  is subject  to the equivalent  of a run on a bank (Diamond  and Dybvig,  1983)  where
creditors, particularly  those with short-term  claims,  suddenly  withdraw  from the country, leaving the country
with an acute shortage  of foreign  exchange  liquidity. The withdrawal  may be rational  for each creditor  as there
is lack of coordination  among creditors  and each individual's  incentive  is to withdraw  first, as she fears that
others  will withdraw  before  her.
3.  Collapse  of a bubble: the collapse  of a stochastic  speculative  bubble as in Blanchard  and Watson  (1982) and
others which was itself a  rational equilibrium,  but nevertheless  was ex-post irrational and had a positive
probability  of collapse  all along.
4.  Moral hazard crisis: excessive,  overly risky investment  by banks and other financial  institutions  which were
able to borrow as they had implicit  or explicit  guarantees  from the government  on their liabilities  and were
undercapitalized  and/or weakly regulated  (Akerlof  and Romer, 1993). Foreign  as well as domestic  creditors
went along with this risky behavior,  as they knew the government  or international  financial  institutions  would
bail them out. Krugman,  1998,  applies  this model  to the East  Asian  crisis.
5.  Disorderly  workouts:  this refers to the equivalent  of a grab  for assets in the absence  of a domestic  bankruptcy
system  in case  of a liquidity  problem  of a corporate  (Sachs, 1994a,  1994b  and Miller  and Zhang, 1997). Since
there does not exist a means of reorganizing  claims  in case of an international  liquidity  problem  a disorderly
workout  would  result,  which in  turn will destroy  value  and create  a debt overhang.
9Conceptually,  there is some overlap between these categories,  and, in practice there will be elements of each
explanation present-simultaneously or at different  points in time-in  causing or triggering financial crises or
making  a financial  crisis more  severe. And  none of these  hypotheses  are necessarily  a complete  explanation.'
Although  the  causes  of  the  East  Asian  crisis  are  comiplex  and  multifaceted,  and  with
important  differences  across  countries,  we  can  distinguish  two  main  "competing"  hypotheses
regarding the type of financial crises which have now become the subject of "popular"  debate
(for  example, see the  Economist, April  10, 1998).  One hypothesis  is where  the underlying
structural weaknesses and macro-economic policies were such that a crisis was inevitable.  The
other hypothesis  is where, while there were these weaknesses,  it was the  sudden run on the
currency that led to a shift to a worse equilibrium.  This distinction is similar to the ones taken by
Radelet  and  Sachs  1998-they  contrast  the  possibility  of  a  financial  panic  and  disorderly
workout with all the other hypotheses-and  Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998-they  contrast
weak fundamentals with financial panic.
Distinguishing  between  these two, alternative  hypotheses  is  important  for the  policy
agenda.  In case of a bank-type run cum disorderly workout situation, ample and rapid provision
of liquidity-by  the government of the countries involved, international financial institutions and
others-could  have  helped  stabilize  the  situation  and  prevented  the  financial  crises  from
worsening (for arguments along these lines, see Feldstein,  1998).  In case structural problems
were the cause, the provision of liquidity would at best have pasted over the problems for a short-
period, but  iot for long,  and  might actually have aggravated the problems, given the  moral
hazard  problems  of  easy  provision  of  liquidity  delaying  reforms,  especially  on  structural
weaknesses.
We  will  take  the  intermediate  view,  but  leaning  more  toward  the  financial  panic
interpretation.  In the run up to the crisis, the East Asian economies most affected by the crisis
did  demonstrate  growing  vulnerability,  although  lack  of  good  information  masked  some
weaknesses such as the magnitude of unhedged short-term debt:. Other weaknesses, for instance
in the financial sector and corporate governance, were well recognized for some time.  These
weaknesses did not raise alarm bells in the minds of many investors, except in the last year or so
for  Thailand  and  in the  last stages  for  Korea.  An  important  difference  between  the  East  Asian
crisis and the debt crisis of the 1980s and even the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 is that fiscal
policy and public sector debt did not contribute to the increase in vulnerability or in triggering
the crisis.
Instead, the growing vulnerability can be attributed to  the private investment boom  and
surge in capital inflows, which itself were based on the region's  success-particularly  its strong
' For example,  the financial  panic explanation  requires  that there  are significant  real effects that trigger a move to a
worse equilibrium. Since  most East Asian countries  had low  public, external debt,  however,  it is not obvious  why
governments  of these countries could not have prevented the occurrence  of financial crises by taken over or
guaranteeing  those private  sector liabilities  which  were subject  to a bank run, that is not being rolled  over. Surely,
moral  hazard  was a concern,  but this was in  the end often  not avoided  anyhow  and besides,  the cost of the crises  was
often so high that it could have been a better policy. Currently,  a complete  model, which includes  the tradeoffs
between  public  and private  debt, is missing.
10economic fundamentals and the structural reforms of the 1980s.  But the pace and pattern  of
investment  in  recent  years,  and  the  way  in  which  it  was  financed,  made  some  countries
vulnerable  to  a  loss  of  investor  confidence  and  reversal  in  capital  flows.  This  growing
vulnerability was the result of private sector decisions rather than public sector deficits. These
private sector activities took place, however, in the context of government policies that did not
do enough to discourage excessive risk-taking while providing too little regulatory control and
insufficient transparency to allow markets to recognize and correct the problems.  At the root of
the problem were weak and poorly  supervised financial sectors against the backdrop of large
capital inflows.  Equally, inadequate corporate governance and lack of transparency masked the
poor quality and riskiness of investments.  In addition, although macroeconomic policies  were
generally sound, pegged exchange-rate regimes and implicit guarantees titled incentives toward
excessive short-term borrowing and capital inflows.  These weaknesses in the policy framework
were aggravated by undisciplined foreign lending and volatile international flows.
In attempting to provide an explanation of the East Asia crisis, the remainder of the paper
distinguishes between three aspects: first,  the causes and manifestations of vulnerability; second,
the factors that triggered the crisis; and, third, the factors and dynamics that have led to a more
severe downturn than was generally anticipated.
The paper identifies four main elements that led to growing vulnerability:  (i) weaknesses
in the financial sector, both moral hazard and incentive problems as well as institutional  and
regulatory weaknesses; (ii) weaknesses in corporate governance and transparency; (iii) incentives
to borrow imprudently because of the interaction between macroeconomic conditions and policy
responses to incipient inflows and microeconomic factors both on the domestic and international
side  (including lack of due  diligence on the part of foreign lenders).  While ex-post  perhaps
inconsistent and ex-ante worrisome, many of these weaknesses were generally known for some
time.
The main manifestations of these weaknesses were: (i) widening deficits and slowdowns
in productivity and export growth; (ii) increased banking sector ifragility  associated with lending
and asset booms and rising exposure to risky sectors; (iii) high leverage; and (iv) currency and
maturity mismatches that left some economies highly vulnerable to reversals in capital flows.
There were, therefore, three dimensions to  this growing vulneirability.  First, there was  some
deterioration in economic fundamentals but this started from strong initial conditions. Second,
growing  contingent liabilities that  were  not  adequately recognized before  the crisis.  Third,
increased risks of an external liquidity crunch primarily because a large buildup of external short-
term debt, much of which was unhedged.
However, the magnitude of these weaknesses differed considerably between countries.
They were the most pronounced in the case of Thailand, and it was growing perceptions about a
misalignment of the exchange rate that led that led to pressures on the Baht, much the same way
as in Mexico in 1994 and the Czech Republic in 1996.  There were also similar warning signals
in the case of Korea.  But in the case of the other Southeast countries, it was the devaluation of
the  Baht  that  triggered  the  speculative  attacks,  thus  negating  an  explanation  based  on
11fundamentals only as these would have shown up in more striking country differences than in a
general regional slowdown.
The buildup of vulnerabilities and some similarities in financial conditions and structures
did  leave some East Asian countries exposed to  the possibility of a bank. run in  the face of
shocks.  Even where  they did  not trigger the crisis, there  was increased  focus on  structural
weaknesses and financial structures in the aftermath of the initial attacks.  Together with delayed
policy responses and political transition and uncertainty in some of the countries, and the lack of
mechanisms for orderly debt workouts-both  external and domestic-this  led to a sharp erosion
in investor confidence and to real effects.  The result was a move to a worse equilibrium, which
resulted in a loss of creditworthiness, which could not be offset fully with an infusion of liquidity
from official sources.
Weaknesses in East Asia's  Financial Sectors
Weaknesses  in  financial  systems  were  probably  the  single  most  important  factor
contributing to  vulnerability  in East  Asian economies  (see  further Claessens  and  Glaessner,
1997).  Insufficient capital adequacy ratios, inadequate legal lending limits on single borrowers
or group of related borrowers, inadequate asset classification systems and poor provisioning for
possible losses, poor disclosure and transparency of bank operations, and lack of provisions for
an exit policy of troubled financial institutions all contributed 1o banking fragility in many East
Asian countries. Relative to other developing countries, a limited role of foreign banks in  local
markets (Claessens and Glaessner, 1998) also reduced the ability of banking systems to absorb
shocks, and more generally, inhibited the institutional development of banks.
Figure 111.1  illustrates these weaknesses as perceived by the market in the fall of  1997.
Each of these elements considered on their own or together may not lead to financial distress,
and all East Asian countries have performed well over spite of these weaknesses.  In combination
with other weaknesses and policies, they can, however, lead to or exacerbate a crisis.  The figure
also  shows  that  there  were  considerable  differences  among  countries  in  terms  of  financial
fragility, with the Philippines, for exarnple, considerably less fragile than the other East Asian
Economies, except for Hong Kong and Singapore.
Importantly  interacting  with  these  weaknesses  was  a  process  of  financial  sector
liberalization.  This process was composed of two reinforcingy  elements.  First, domestic  and
external financial liberalization led to increased competition in the banking system that reduced
the franchise value of banks and induced them to pursue risky investment strategies.  Rapidly
growing NBFIs  were  an additional  important source of competition  for banks,  especially  in
Korea and Thailand.  Furthermore, as NBFIs were generally less regulated and subject to weaker
supervision than banks, their growth exacerbated fragility direct]ly.
12Figure III.1
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The  lingering  effects of  past  policies  dealing  with  financial distress  exacerbated  the
impact of these weaknesses.  Specifically, several countries had experienced a  financial crisis
that was partly resolved through partial or full public bailouts.  This includes Thailand (1983-87),
Malaysia  (1985-88)  and  Indonesia  (1994).  These  bailouts  reinforced  the  perception  of  an
implicit deposit or even wider liability cover to the detriment of market discipline.  Indeed, in
some cases, management of the restructured financial institutions was not changed.
Weaknesses in Corporate Governance and Transparency
While many East Asian countries had made rapid and substantial progress in developing
their  capital,  especially  equity,  markets  during  the  1990s, both  corporate  governance  and
disclosure systems were still weak and capital markets played a limited role in the governance of
firms.  Perverse connections between lenders and borrowers were common and led to insider and
poor quality lending (see Figure Il1.1), and the financing of prestige projects and other "white
elephants."  There were four, related problems in corporate governance: concentrated ownership;
weak incentives; poor protection of minority shareholders; and weak information standards. But,
most of these problems were not more severe in East Asia than in many developing countries.
- Concentrated Ownership. High ownership concentration is typically both a symptom
and a cause of weak corporate governance.  It is a symptom because in the face of weak legal and
regulatory protection against abuse by corporate insiders, ownership concentration is a means for
investors to be better able to monitor and control management.  It is a cause because, given high
ownership  concentration,  large,  presumably  politically  powerful  shareholders  will  not  be  a
source of pressure  for improvements in disclosure and  governance as those  may  erode their
corporate  control  and inside owner benefits.  Reflecting both  developments, Asian  firms  are
13generally  closely held and managed  by majority,  often family, interests. On average,  excluding
Korea,  the three largest  shareholders  own some  50% of the shares  of the ten largest non-financial
private firms and 46% for the ten largest  firms in Asia. 2 While  this ownership  concentration  in
Asia is not very different  from that in Latin  America,  it does  raise the possibility  of increased  risk
taking.
- Weak Market  Incentives.  The incentives  to improve,  either  at the individual  firm level
or at the country ievel, disclosure  and governance  were limitedl  in many countries. Many firms
had comfortable  relations  with banks and other financial  intermediaries  and were easily able to
raise equity through new stock issues. This lack of market discipline  appears to be due to five
factors. First, the interlocking  ownership  between financial  intermediaries  and corporates,  as in
Chile during the early 1980s, as well as other relationships  played a role.  Korea is a good
example of how interrelationships  between banks and corporates reduced market discipline.
Second,  the rapid and large increase  in stock  prices in the early 1990s  throughout  emerging  Asia
may have reduced the sensitivity  of equity investors to company disclosure and governance.
Third, the requirement  in some  countries  for government  approval  of new equity  issues (and their
prices), government  ownership  and contingent  government  support (e.g., in large infrastructure
projects) may have also comforted  investors. Fourth, there are few, well governed  domestic
institutional investors in the region. Privately managed institutional  investors are rare and the
large publicly controlled funds and investment banks have been mostly passive players in
corporate matters. And fifth, key market institutions  that play a key role in facilitating and
creating the  incentives for market discipline to  work in  industrial countries are not  fully
developed  in the region.  For example,  credit rating agencies  were only recently introduced in
many countries.  The nascent regulatory framework further aggravated this lack of market
institutions. While by 1997  most East Asian countries  had built the legal and regulatory  basis to
move from a merit to  a  market based regulatory system, rnarkets did yet not necessarily
adequately  perform  their signaling  and monitoring  functions.
- Protecting Minority Shareholders.  The legal and regulatory systems of many
countries  in the region include a relatively  wide set of provisions  to protect shareholders  from
abuse by insiders.  Table III.1 (based  on La Porta et al., 1997  and 1998) compares  the investor
and creditor  protection  in East Asia with other regions. The table shows that shareholder'  and
creditor  protection  is stronger  in Asia than in Latin America.' In enforcement  of property rights,
however,  the region,  especially  Indonesia  and the Philippines,  scores  much below Latin  America,
meaning  that shareholders  could not fully use their legal protecting  mechanisms. Furthermore,
weak disclosure meant shareholders  often did not have the information to judge  corporate
performance  and insider  behavior.
2  Not  corrected  for  shareholder  affiliation  and  cross-shareholding  between  firns  (see  further  La  Porta  et.  al. 1998).
14Table 111.1  Investor Protection in Asia and Latin America
Investor  Creditor  Judicial  Investor  Creditor  Judicial
Protection  Protection  Enforcement  Protection  Protection  Enforcement
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
India  2  4  6.1  Argentina  4  1  5.6
Indonesia  2  4  4.4  Brazil  4  1  6.5
Malaysia  4  4  7.7  Chile  4  2  6.8
Pakistan  5  4  4.3  Colombia  I  0  5.7
Philippines  4  0  4.1  Mexico  0  0  6.0
Sri Lanka  2  3  5.0  Venezuela  I  na  6.2
Thailand  3  3  5.9  Average  2.2  0.8  6.1
Average  3.1  3.1  5.4
(1)  An index of how well the legal framework protects equity investors.  It will equal six when (1) shareholders are
allowed to  vote  by mail; (2)  shareholders are not  required  to deposit  share  in advance  of  a  meeting;  (3)
cumulative voting is allowed; (4) when the minimum percentage of share capital required to call a meeting  is
less than  10%; (5) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place; and (6) when legislation mandates one  vote
per share for all shares (or equivalent).
(2) An index of how well the  legal framework protects secured creditors.  It will equal four when: (I)  there are
minimum restrictions, e.g., creditors' consent, for firmns  to file for reorganization; (2) there is no automatic stay
on collateral; (3) debtor looses control of the firm during a reorganization; and (4) secured creditors are given
priority during a reorganization.
(3) An index measuring the quality of judicial enforcement ranging from  I to 10 (best) equal to the average of five
sub-indexes  measuring:  (1)  efficiency  of  the judicial  system; (2)  rule  of  law; (3)  corruption;  (4)  risk  of
expropriation; and (5) risk of contract repudiation.
Source:  La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998).
- Accounting Standards and Practices. Accounting and auditing standards in the region
are generally consistent with those issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee, 3
and  Malaysia  and  Thailand  have  strong  reporting  standards. 4 The  Philippines'  standards,
however, appear weaker.  There is strong anecdotal evidence, however, that accounting practices
in the region were not yet up to international standards. Compliance with accounting rules was
furthermore hampered by weaknesses in industry self-regulatory organizations.  In Indonesia, for
instance, in the absence of strong professional associations, the official capital market regulatory
agency licenses legal and accounting professionals to work in the securities areas. An additional
problem has been a shortage of well-qualified accountants and auditors, especially in Indonesia,
the Philippines  and  Thailand. The impact of this  shortage of well-qualified  accountants was
compounded by restrictions on the activities of foreign accounting firms in many countries in the
region (e.g., Indonesia).
Incentives to Borrow Abroad
Macroeconomic  conditions  prevailing  in  1994-96, together  with  the  policy  mix  the
authorities chose  in response, created incentives for firms to borrow abroad on  an unhedged
basis.  Micro-factors  further  added to  this.  There were  considerable differences,  however,
3  Malaysia,  for instance,  has adopted  24 of the 31 international  accounting  standards  without  alteration,  while the
others  are generally  consistent  with international  standards  (World  Bank, 1997).
4 The Center for International  Analysis  and Research  is an investment  advisor  located  in the United  States. The
index is based  on the reporting  practices  of major  domestic  corporates  with regard  to 85 disclosure  variables.
15between countries and within countries in the incentives and possibilities  facing entities in the
financial and corporate sectors to borrow abroad.
Macroeconomic conditions 1994-96:  As  mentioned earlier, following the structural
reforms of the mid to late  1980s, the South East Asian  countries saw sharp increases in their
investment rates. For example, in Indonesia investment/GDP rose from an average 25 percent
during  1985-89 to 32 percent during 1990-96, while in Korea the investment rates rose from an
average of 30 percent to 37 percent during the period. Malaysia and Thai]land saw even larger
increases-from  26 percent to 40 percent and 30 percent to 42 percent of GDP respectively.
Against a backdrop of high rates of investment, the four countries that have been hardest
hit by the crisis-Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand--all  experienced an acceleration in
the growth of domestic demand and the emergence of demand pressures during  1994-96. The
case of the Philippines has been somewhat different, not only in terms of economic conditions,
but  also in the timing of the economic cycle during 1994-96.
In Korea, the growth of domestic demand picked up very sharply in 1994 and 1995, with
its contribution to GDP growth averaging around 9 percent, from 4 percent in 1993. In Malaysia,
the contribution of domestic demand to GDP growth had already accelerated in 1993 from 3.5
percent the previous year to over 9 percent. During 1994 and 1  995, the contribution of domestic
demand to GDP growth increased further to around 13 percent. Similarly, Thailand which had
already  seen a two percentage points pickup in the contribution of domestic demand to  GDP
growth in 1993, saw a further pickup in the contribution of  domestic demand in 1994 and 1995.
Indonesia saw an acceleration in the growth of domestic demand slightly later-in  1994-which
was sustained in 1995 and into 1996. As mentioned, the economic conditions and timing of the
macroeconomic cycle in the Philippines was different. Following a period of stagnation during
1991-92, economic activity grew by 2 percent in 1993 and increased progressively to reach 5.7
percent in 1996. In all five countries the acceleration in the growth of domestic demand reflected
both a pickup in the growth of investment and consumption, although the relative mix differed
across countries. Also, in all five countries, with the sharp pick up in the contribution of domestic
demand, the contribution of the external sector to GDP growth turned negative during the period
(see Figure III.2).
With  growing access to  international markets-which  has,  in  part, been the result of
changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the  international  environment  that  have  increased  the
responsiveness of investors to cross border investment opportumities  during the 1990s-inflows
of private capital contributed to, and reinforced, these demand pressures (Box Il1.1).
The demand pressures were manifested primarily in a sharp widening of current account
deficits,  although there was also some  increase in inflation (Figure III.3). Malaysia's  current
account deficit widened by more than two percentage points in  1995 from under 6.3 percent to
8.5 percent of GDP, while Thailand's-which  had been high throughout the 1990s-increased
from 5.6 percent of GDP in  1994 to 8 percent of GDP in 1995. Although Korea had run very
small current account deficits throughout the 1990s, the change in current account position since
1993 was significant-from  a small surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP in  1993 to a deficit of 1.2
16percent of GDP in 1994,  2 percent  of GDP in 1995  and then almost  5 percent of GDP in 1996.  In
Indonesia,  the current  account  deficit  widened  from 1.6  percent of GDP in 1994  to 3.4 percent of
GDP in 1995  and further  to 3.6 percent  of GDP  in 1996.  In the Philippines,  demand  pressures  did
not emerge until 1996.  Although  inflation  rose by 1.5 percentage  points in 1994,  this was largely
due to supply shocks,  and the widening  of the current account  deficit to GDP that occurred  with
the initial pickup  in economic  activity  in 1993,  reversed  thereafter.
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18Figure M3  Inflation and current account positions
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19Box E.1 Private  capital  flows  and domestic  macroeconomic  cycles
In principle, private capital flows can both generate and exacerbate domestic  macroeconomic
cycles through  various channels.
*First, in a more integrated setting, domestic demand pressures can be accommodated  more
easily by borrowing  abroad. That is, private capital flows can validate excess demand pressures.  If this
excess demand falls primarily  on the  tradeables  sector, it is likely to be manifested  in a widening of the
current account deficit, while if it falls on non-tradeable  goods, it will lead to domestic inflationary
pressures.
*Second,  a country  that has become  relatively more attractive to investors (whether  due higher
domestic returns and improved  prospects or due to decline in returns elsewhere)  will receive inflows  of
private capital, which, in  turn, can  lead to  problems of  domestic absorption aiid "overheating"
pressures-even  if these flows are financing investments,  since in general, there is lead time involved
before these investments  translate  into productive  capacity.  Again,  this will be manifested  in a widening
of the current  account deficit  and/or inflationary  pressures.
*Third, to extent that the excess demand falls on domestic  assets it will contribute  toasset price
inflation. In turn, such asset price increases and attendant increases in financial wealth can further
contribute  to a consumption  boom. That is, private capital flows can contribute  to a consumption  boom
and macroeconomic  overheating  indirectly  as well.
In fact, capital flows have tended to move very much in tandem with domestic  macroeconomic
cycles-particularly  in  Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. In  Malaysia although there was less of a
correspondence  between  the capital inflows  and demand  pressures  in the early 1990s,  from the mid 1990s
onwards,  capital  inflows  have moved  with the domestic  macro-economic  cycle.
Box Figure  III.1 Capital  flows  and excess  demand  pressures
C  C0OS  19  2  1¶931  994  I  995  1 9969  1  *99  ¶990  I9  1  ,921  993,  994  1  999  997
f  s  Sor  1~~~~~~~0  (P¶\.t
M.1.  V.  1.  . . _  00_-
Excess  demand  is defined  as the percentage  deviation  of actual  GDP from potential  GDP. Potential  GDP  was estimated  using
the  Hodrick  Prescott  filter.
20Macroeconomic policy responses.  The policy mix used to deal with the overheating
pressures and capital inflows added to the impetus for further inflows of private capital-and  for
the accumulation of short-term, unhedged external liabilities in particular.
In dealing with the demand pressures, relatively greater reliance was placed on monetary
policy. The tightening of monetary policy increased domestic interest rates and the differential
between domestic and international interest rates.
Adding to the pressures on domestic interest rates was the change in the stance of fiscal
policy during  1994-96. It is important to recognize that the South East Asian had undertaken
fiscal reforms and  consolidation during  the mid to late  1980s and had  seen  very  significant
improvements in  their overall  fiscal balances. During the  1990s their  fiscal policy  remained
conservative in the medium-term  structural sense. However, in light of the cyclical upturn  in
economic activity  in  1994-96, the fiscal positions  were not contractionary.  Indeed, the fiscal
impulse (the change in the fiscal stance) turned positive at a time when these economies were
experiencing overheating pressures.
Finally  the  exchange  rate  systems  of  the  Southeast Asian  countries  also  played  an
important role. Concerned with preventing an appreciation of their real exchange rates, the South
East Asian countries maintained pegged exchange rate systems--with  the authorities intervening
in the foreign exchange markets to maintain the peg in the face of the large capital inflows 5. It
could be argued that allowing a greater degree of nominal exchange rate appreciation may have
reduced the incentives to borrow abroad-in  as much as an appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate increases expectations of a future depreciation.
The  fact  that  the exchange  rate policies  in  the  Soutlh East Asian  countries  implied
relatively predictable nominal rates, furthermore, encouraged thte  accumulation of these external
liabilities in the form  of unhedged obligations 6. In particular, by reducing the perceptions  of
exchange rate risks, the relatively narrow range of nominal exchange rate fluctuations reduced
the incentives to hedge external borrowing. Moreover, since short-term flows are more affected
by  fluctuations  around  the  central  parity-whereas  long-term  flows  are  more  affected
movements in the central parity itself-the  relatively narrow exchange rate movements meant
that  even potentially  very  short-term flows were not  deterred  from responding  to  the higher
interest rate differentials.
5  As discussed  below,  however,  the pegging  of the exchange  rates  did not in fact, ex post, prevent  their real
exchange  rates from  appreciating.  This is because  these South  East Asian  countries  were, de facto,  pegging  to the
US dollar and there  were large  cross  currency  movements  between  the US dollar  and the currencies  of their other
trading  partners  (notably  Japan)  during 1995-96.
6 The predictable  nature of the nominal exchange  rate is borne out, for example,  in the fact that the standard
deviations  of the error term from a regression  of the nominal  exchange  rate on a constant  and a time trend during
1990-96  are very low for all four countries.  Within  these, Malaysia's  nominal  exchange  rate was found to be the
least  predictable.
21In sum, domestic interest rates (adjusted  for actual exchange  rate imovements)  rose and
were sustained  through sterilization  efforts during 1994-96,  which encouraged  further  inflows of
capital 7. And since  short-term capital flows tend to  be  the  most  responsive to  interest
differentials,  and nominal  exchange  rate movements  were relatively limited,  the composition  of
external  liabilities  became  more skewed  towards  short-term  unhedged  obligations 8 . Moreover,  as
mentioned above, the 1990s has seen a progressive increase in the responsiveness  of private
capital flows to cross border  investment  opportunities 9. Thus, while most of the Southeast  Asian
countries had experienced  earlier bouts of macroeconomic  overheating  (for example, Indonesia
saw demand  pressures  emerge  in 1990/91,  as did Thailand),  and while the macroeconomic  policy
response had been similar,  the speed and magnitude  of the accumulation  of short-term  external
liabilities  was much greater  during 1994-96.
Indonesia. Albeit to  a  lesser extent than in  the  previous bout  of  macroeconomic
overheating  (1990-91), Indonesia  relied quite heavily on monetary policy in dealing with the
demand pressures  in 1995-96.  Following  a rapid growth  in  mrronetary  aggregates  in 1994,  which
had been based on an expansion  of domestic  credit, monetary  policy  was tightened  significantly
by mid-1995. The primary instrument  of monetary managerment  was open market operations
using SBIs (BI certificates  of deposits),  but use of  discount  operations  was also made. This was
reinforced by measures to control the growth of bank credit more directly. In particular, BI
emphasized "moral suasion", and banks were required to submit annual business plans and
implementation  reports,  and to set guidelines  for credit  policy formulation.
Although  the exchange rate band had been widened several times during late 1994 and
1996-in  an effort to further enhance  the effectiveness  of monetary  policy-Indonesia still had
to undertake  significant  sterilization,  particularly  in 1996,  as mnonetary  tightening  induced  further
capital inflows". As Figure III.4a shows, the potential contribution  of net foreign assets to
reserve  money  growth of 72 percent in 1996  was offset  by a significant  contraction  of domestic
credit,  which resulted  in a much  lower actual  growth  of reserve  money  of 37 percent.  Despite  the
large scale open market operations  to sterilize  inflows and maintain  a tight monetary stance  (the
stock of SBIs outstanding  rose from Rp 12 trillion at end 1996 as compared  to 5 trillion at end
' Theoretically the actual depreciation  of the exchange  rate is best unbiased  estimate  of the expected  depreciation
only in the absence  of a peso problem  (and with constant  risk premia).  It is difficult to argue that a peso problem
existed  in the Southeast  Asian  countries  prior to early 1997.
s This is also borne out empirically  in cross  country  analysis.  Montiel  ancl  Reinhart  (1997) for example  find that an
intensification  of monetary  tightening  and sterilization  is associated  with an increase in the volume of short-term
capital.
9 One indication  of the fact that capital  flows have become  more  responsive  to expected  rates of return and that the
Southeast  Asian countries  have become  more financially  integrated  is the increase  in  the "offset"  coefficient-the
degree to which  a contraction  in domestic  credit is offset  by inflows  of capital-during the 1990s.  In Indonesia  for
example,  the offset coefficient  increased  from 0.47 (i.e. 47 percent of domestic  credit are offset by capital inflows
within the quarter)  during 1988-93, to 0.64 during 1990-96.  Another  indication  of greater accessibility  is the fact
that in the early 1990s,  of the firms that were rated,  only those rated A or above had access  to international  bond
issuance. During 1994-96, 35 percent of the rated corporates  from the Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia,
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Korea  and Thailand)  that issued  international  bonds,  were rated  below  A grade.
" The exchange  rate band was widened  several  times from I percent in January 1994  up to  8 percent  in September
1996.
221995), monetary  aggregates continued to expand rapidly in  1996. Several additional measures
were therefore introduced during the course of the year. These included increasing banks'  reserve
requirements from 2 percent of deposit liabilities to 3 percent, which was made effective as from
February 1996, and resorting to greater moral suasion to limit the growth in domestic credit".
Fiscal management had been a major element in the Government's success in adjusting to
the  large  external  shocks  that  Indonesia experienced  in  the  1980s, and  Indonesia's  fiscal
accounts continued to show  improvements during the 1990s. In fact, since 1994 Indonesia had
recorded  fiscal  surpluses-generated  in  part by  privatization--which  Indonesia  had  used  to
prepay external public debt and improve its debt indicators 1 2 . And in both  1995 and  1996 the
conservative fiscal position allowed a sizable buildup  in government deposits with BI, which
served  as a  moderating  influence on reserve money growth.  Despite the  conservative  fiscal
position however,  fiscal policy behaved pro-cyclically in  1996. In particular, while the fiscal
stance  (which measures the  difference between the  cyclically neutral  balance and  the actual
balance)  remained contractionary,  it  became less contractionary  (i.e. the  fiscal  impulse  was
positive) at the time that demand pressures had intensified 1"  (Figure 111.4  b).
These factors together-particularly  the tightenirng  of monetary policy and sterilization-
led to higher domestic interest rates during 1995-96 than that  prevailing in 1994 (when interest
rates were raised to discourage capital outflows in the aftermath of the Mexico crisis). The three
month deposit rates for example, increased by almost three percentage points at the end of 1995
compared to the previous year. At the same time, US dollar interest rates declined during the
course of mid 1995-1996. As a result, while the differentials between domestic and international
interest  rates (adjusted for  exchange rate movements)  were not  as large  as had  been  in  the
previous macroeconomic cycle of  1990-91, they nonetheless increased sizably during  1995-96.
The differential between the 3 month domestic deposit rate and the 3 month US LIBOR rate for
example, rose from an average of 8 percent during  1993-94 to over 11 percent during 1995-96
(Figure 111.4  c).
At the same time, Indonesia's exchange rate policy playecd  a role in reducing incentives to
hedge the external borrowing that was taking place in response to the higher domestic interest
rates. Until the exchange rate was floated in August of 1997, Indonesia maintained  a pegged
exchange rate system' 4, in which BI set the central rate and intervened in the foreign exchange
market at a band around the central rate. Although in princivle the central rate of the rupiah was
" Prior  to February  1996,  reserve  requirements  of commercial  banks  consisted  of cash  in vault and demand  deposits
with Bl. Since February 1996 however,  cash in vault no longer counts as a component  of reserve requirements.
Minimum reserve requirements  are set at a certain percentage  of commercial  banks funds, defined as demand
deposits,  time deposits,  savings  deposits and other current liabilities.  Since February 1996,  the coverage  has been
expanded  to include  the above liabilities,  regardless  of maturity.  Reserve  requirements  were further increased  to 5
percent  of deposit  liabilities  in April 1997.
12 Prepayment  was also used as a means of reducing  the net inflows  of capital  and domestic  overheating  problems.
'3 The fiscal impulse  is analyzed  in terms of the respect  to non-oil  fiscal  balance  and demand  pressures  in the non-
oil  sector.
" Indonesia instituted  a managed  float on November  15, 1978,  and replaced  the US dollar as its external anchor
with an undisclosed  basket of major currencies.  Since August 14 1997,  Indonesia  has had a "dirty" float, in which
the exchange  rate is essentially  market  determined  with sporadic  interventions  by the authorities.
23set against a basket of currencies,  in practice,  Indonesia  attempted  to target  the real exchange  rate
by depreciating  the rupiah vis a vis the US dollar to broadly offset the inflation differentials
between the two countries" 5. This implied  a relatively  constant  rate of depreciation  of the rupiah.
Moreover, while Indonesia had been progressively  widening the  exchange rate band, the
existence  of a band further  helped in creating  a relatively  precdictable  nominal  exchange rate. In
other words, the movement  of the central  parity was fairly constant,  and the fluctuations  around
the parity were relatively  limited.  This relatively  predictable  behavior  is borne  out by the fact that
the variability of the  nominal exchange rate around the trend was less than 0.25 percent
throughout  the 1  990s (Figure  lII.4d).
'5  This is corroborated  in the results  of a regression  of the rupiah/lUS  dollar  nominal  exchange  rate on the inflation
differential  between  Indonesia  and the US, specified  in the following  form:
log(nexch) 1 = 7.55+ 0.67 log(idncpi  - uscpi)t_l
(494)  (100)  '
a4jR
2 =0.98
where nexch is the nominal exchange  rate (defined  as rupiah to I US dollar), idncpi  is the Indonesian  consumer
price index and uscpi the US consumer price index. This suggests that a  I percentage point increase in the
differential between the domestic price level and the US price level., led to  a depreciation of the nominal
rupiah/dollar  exchange rate of 0.68 percentage  points the following quarter. (Figures in parenthesis  indicate t-
statistics:  * indicates  significance  at the I percent  level).
24Figure  III.4  Indonesia--Policy  responses and  incentives to borrow  abroad
Monetary  policy:  components  of reserve  money  Fiscal  policy:  fiscal  impulse  and  demand
growth  pressures
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25Korea  With the expansion in economic activity during  1994-95, there was a  sizable
increase in BOK's  net foreign asset position, reflecting both a small current account surplus as
well as capital inflows. BOKs responded by sterilizing through the issuance of large amounts of
Monetary Stabilization bonds (MSBs) (Figure III.5a).
Fiscal policy in Korea has generally been formulated within a medium term framework,
subject to the constraint that outlays remain broadly in line with revenues. While this has helped
maintain a conservative fiscal position, the focus on expenditure objectives has meant that fiscal
policy  has, on occasions, been quite procyclical. In  1994, the  fiscal stance, while remaining
contractionary, was slightly procyclical, although relative to previous cycles, fiscal policy was
less procyclical during the 1994 overheating bout (Figure III.5b).
With  the  pickup in  economic activity  and  tightening of  the  monetary  policy  stance,
domestic  interest  rates  rose  and  the  differential  between  domestic  interest  rates  and  the
international rates, adjusted for exchange rate movements, widened significantly during 1994-95
relative to 1993 (Figure III.5c).
Under Korea's market average rate (MAR) exchange system, the norninal won/US dollar
rate  was allowed to  float in  the interbank market within  a daily  range around  the weighted
average of the previous day's interbank rates for spot transactions, and the range was widened in
late 1993 to plus/minus 1 percent. Since the BOK acted as a buyer/seller of last order to prevent
what it considered excessive exchange rate fluctuations, the system was still a managed float.
From the end of 1994 until the first half of 1996 though, Korea did allow the nominal exchange
rate to appreciate. This reduced the pressures on domestic inflation, and-by  alleviating some of
the need to tighten  monetary policy and hence resulting in  lower domestic  interest rates than
would have otherwise have been the case), as well as by increasing the expectations of some
depreciation in the future-it  reduced the impetus for further capital inflows. Moreover, while
less so than the Malaysian ringgit, the won varied more around the trend-particularly  from early
1994 onwards-than  either the Thai baht or the Indonesian rupiah, (Figure III.5d).
26Figure  11.5  Korea-Policy  responses  and incentives to borrow
Monetary policy:  components of reserve money  Fiscal policy:  fiscal  impulse and demand
growth  pressures
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27Malaysia.  In Malaysia, monetary policy played a relatively important role in dealing
with the macroeconomic during 1995-96, although, as discussed below, Malaysia also used the
nominal  exchange  rate  to  a  greater  extent  than Indonesia  and  Thailand to  absorb  potential
overheating  pressures  associated  with  capital  inflows.  Monetary  policy  was  tightened
progressively from late 1995 to mid 1996 (Figure III.6a). In recent years, changes in the statutory
reserve requirements (SRR), direct borrowing from, or lending to, the banking system, and the
transfer of government and Employees Provident Fund (EPF) deposits to the central bank, have
been the main instruments of monetary management. These have been supplemented by the sales
of government securities and Bank Negara bills. In 1996 the statutory reserve requirements were
increased twice in February and March to 13½ percent of eligible liabilities. In addition, over the
past two years, Malaysia introduced a number of credit control measures, both in order to reduce
banks' credit expansion and for prudential reasons.
As in the other Southeast Asian countries, the fiscal restructuring and consolidation that
Malaysia implemented, resulted in significant improvements in Malaysia's fiscal balance during
the  1990s. In  1995 however,  while still achieving a  surplus, the federal government position
registered a sharp decline from 3 percent of GDP in  1994 to  1.3 percent of GDP. (The slower
pace of growth of revenues was in part due to income tax cuts and reductions in import duties).
The budget surplus declined again marginally to 1.1 percent of GDP in 1996, and although, as in
Indonesia,  the  fiscal  stance  remained  contractionary  in  1995  and  1996,  it  became  less
contractionary.  In particular, the  fiscal impulse was  sizably expansionary  in  1995 when  the
economy was experiencing strong demand pressures (Figure IIIL6b).
The policy response reinforced the upward trend in domestic interest rates that had begun
to take  place with  the growing demand pressures in  1995. I)omestic  interest  rates thus rose
during 1995-96 in Malaysia as well-albeit  to a lesser extent than in Indonesia or Thailand. The
3 month fixed deposit rates, for example, increased from 5.3 percent in  1994 to 6.6 percent in
1995 and 7.2 percent in 1996. Again, this led to a widening of interest rate differentials (adjusted
for exchange rate movements) between domestic and international interest rates during 1994-96
relative to 1993 (Figure III.6c).
Compared to Indonesia and Thailand however, Malaysia's exchange rate policy provided
less of an incentive for unhedged external borrowing during the period. In principle, Malaysia
allowed the exchange rate to be market determined, with Bank Negara only intervening to avoid
what it considered excessive exchange rate fluctuations. But since Bank Negara also monitored
the exchange rate against a basket of currencies of major trading partners, in practice, Malaysia
was also implementing a managed float. However, Malaysia allowed the nominal exchange rate
to appreciate by around  6.5 percent between the beginning of  1994 and  mid-1995 (and then
depreciate by 4 percent between mid-  1995 and the beginning of 1996). There was also much less
predictability  associated with  the ringgit-the  variability  of  the ringgit around  its  trend was
around 2 percent in the early  1990s and this variability increased steadily over time  (Figure
III.6d).
28Figure  m.6  Malaysia-Policy  responses  and  incentives to borrow
Monetary policy:  components of reserve money  Fiscal policy:  fiscal impulse  and demand
growth  pressures
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29Philippines. Monetary policy in  the Philippines  is based  largely  on  a  reserve money
program which  takes into account  economic activity, inflation and  the balance  of payments
position.  In  recent  years.  monetary  management  has  relied  on  open  market  operations  and
changes in reserve requirements, moving away from direct controls such as credit controls and
directed credit. In view of the rise in inflation in 1994, reserve money was tightened somewhat,
with the authorities sterilizing much of the capital inflows that had picked up since  1992-93.
Following some loosening in 1995, monetary policy was tightened again in 1996, in response to
the demand pressures that began to emerge. In particular, Bangk.o Sentral intensified open market
operations through borrowings under the reverse repurchase facility (RRP) and the sale of its
holdings of government securities' 6 (Figure III.7a).
On the fiscal front, the 1994-96 period witnessed significant improvements. In particular,
revenue  enhancing  measures  (both  to  widen  the  revenue  base  as  well  as  to  improve  its
buoyancy), combined with privatization, resulted in a decline in the central government overall
deficit from 1.6 percent of GDP in 1993 to 0.4 percent of GDP in 1996. Accordingly, the fiscal
stance  was  contractionary  from  1994  onwards  and  fiscal  impulse  was  only  marginally
expansionary  in  1995-when  there was little signs of demand pressures--and  almost  zero in
1996 when demand pressures began to emerge' 7 (Figure 1II.7b).
Interest rate differentials widened sharply in 1994 when monetary policy was tightened to
deal with the spike in inflation. They declined again however during  1995-96  (Figure III.7c).
The fact that  bank's  reserve requirements were also being lowered during  1993-96 as part of
program to bring down intermediation costs of banks and ultirrmately  interest rates also helped in
exerting downward pressures on domestic interest rates. (Reserve requirements had been reduced
six times during 1993-95 from 24 percent to 15 percent by May 1995).
Although the movements in the nominal exchange rate were signifiicantly lower during
1994-96 than had been the case in the past,  the nominal exchange rate was still less predictable
than in the case of Indonesia or Thailand (Figure III.7d). The macroeconomic incentive for the
accumulation of unhedged short term external debt during this period, was therefore less
16 RRPs involve  the sale by the Bangko  Sentral  of a financial  instrument  or asset with  the commitment  to reverse  the
transaction  in  the future.  These are considered  Bankgo  Sentral's  borrowings  from banks.
'7  The fiscal impulse  has been  calculated  excluding  the privatization  proceeds.
18 In 1992-93,  when  the differentials  in interest  rates  were larger-due to monetary  tightening  and declines  in global
rates, and Philippines  had been receiving  large inflows  of capital inflows  the exchange  rate had been allowed to
appreciate. At  the  same  time  authorities implemented measures to  reduce the  potential loss  of  export
competitiveness,  including  measures  to reduce  the domestic  costs  for exporl:ers.
30Figure  11.7 Philippines-Policy  responses  and incentives  to borrow
Monetary policy:  components of reserve money  Fiscal policy: fiscal  impulse and demand
growth  pressures
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31Thailand  Like Indonesia, Thailand relied quite heavily on monetary policy and sterilized
interventions in responding to the growing demand pressures" 9. As mentioned above, Thailand
began to  see  excess  demand pressures  emerge  in  1995. Accordingly,  monetary  policy  was
tightened progressively during thL course of the year. One of the constraints to undertaking open
market operations was the scarcity of high grade securities and an important measure taken in
1995 was the introduction of the BOT bonds. Despite substantial increases in net foreign assets
in  1995, the contraction in domestic credit extended by BOT succeeded in containing reserve
money growth at 22 percent per annum. In addition BOT introduced a series of administrative
measures designed to  reduce credit growth of banks  and  finance companies.  These included
extending  the credit  monitoring  scheme to  include  finance companies  with  assets  over  B20
billion in late 1994, requiring that reserves for non-resident baht dleposits  be held entirely as non-
remunerated  deposits  at  the  central  bank  in  1995, and  tightening  the  limits  on  financial
institutions'  foreign exchange position also in 1995. During the first half of 1996, when private
capital inflows were sustained, BOT continued to sterilize-through  repurchase operations and
increased issuance of BOT bonds (Figure III.8a).
Following the fiscal consolidation undertaken during the Sixth Development Plan (1987-
91) Thailand had succeeded in eliminating fiscal deficits, and Thailand's fiscal position remained
conservative throughout the 1990s. Although  fiscal surpluses had declined during the Seventh
Development  Plan  (1992-96)-as  the  focus  of  fiscal  policy  shifted  towards  addressing  the
infrastructure bottlenecks-they  remained around 2 percent of G:DP  during 1992-94. In 1995, the
fiscal  surplus  rose  to  2.5  percent  of  GDP.  However,  the  fiscal  stance  which  had  been
expansionary  in  1994 (and  hence had been counter-cyclical gilven that the  economy was not
experiencing overheating pressures), turned slightly more expansionary in 1995 (so that the fiscal
impulse was expansionary) when excess demand pressures emerged. In 1996,  the fiscal surplus
declined to 1.6 percent of GDP, entailing a strongly expansionary fiscal impulse. (Although  the
growth of economic activity had also slowed slightly and demand pressures were lower than in
1995). In both years therefore fiscal policy was pro-cyclical (Figure 1II.8b).
Again, as in the case of Indonesia, domestic interest rates rose sizably. The interest rates
on 3-6 month deposits for example, rose from 8.5 percent in 1'994 to  11.6 percent in 1995, and
the differential with 3 month US LIBOR, adjusted for exchange:  rate movements,  was sustained
at over 5 percent during 1994-96 (Figure III.8c).
Finally,  Thailand's  exchange  rate  policy  was one  which  most  encouraged  unhedged
borrowing-in  as much as it entailed the least variation with respect to the nominal exchange
rate. Since the baht had been devalued in late  1984, it had remained around Bt25 per  dollar,
showing only small changes around this value 20 (Figure III.8d).
19 Although  "sterilized"  interventions  are often  taken to refer solely  to open market  operations,  here we are referring
to the tightening  of monetary  policy in response  to an accumulation  of net foreign assets in the central bank-
whether  through  open market  operations  or by other  means.
20 Since late 1986  until mid-1997,  the Baht  fluctuated  within  a narrow and of plus/minus  3 percent around  its mean
of B/US$  24.5.
32Figure 11.8 Thailand-Policy  responses and incentives to borrow
Monetary  policy:  components  of reserve  money  Fiscal  policy:  fiscal  impulse  and demand
growth  pressures
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33Conclusion.  Overall  therefore,  the  policy  mix  was  one  which  contributed  to  higher
domestic interest rates and entailed relatively limited and predictable exchange rate movements.
The  latter,  in  turn,  reduced  the  perceived risk  of  exchange  rate  depreciation  and  of  large
fluctuations,  which,  combined  with  the high  domestic  interest, rates,  served  to  increase  the
incentives  for  unhedged  external  borrowing.  During  1994-96,  this  policy  mix  was  most
pronounced in the case of Indonesia and Thailand.
- Reinforcing processes.  The process of external financial liberalization, and the surge
in private capital inflows that accompanied it, thus worked as an additional force to reinforce the
upswing in the domestic business cycle. The increase in private capital inflows, which in the case
of East Asian countries was motivated mainly for investment puxposes, provided the additional
liquidity that allowed banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to increase lending, despite
efforts to  sterilize inflows. Furthermore capital flows contributed to increases in  asset prices.
Finally, the policy response to the surge in inflows, which relied primarily on tight monetary
policy and  heavy  sterilization, provided further impetus to  these  flows, which  added to  the
process and  aggravated the  fragility in  the corporate  (and the:refore) banking sector through
sustained high interest rates.  Figure III.9 summarizes the self-reinforcing nature of this process.
Figure  111.9 Selfreinforcing  dynamics resulted  in increased  vulnerability
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Microeconomic Factors. An important explanation for the failure of aggregate macro-
economic policies to stem capital inflows, alter their composition or adequately minimize their
adverse consequences lied in the quality of domestic financial intermediation and the governance
of corporates.  Those East Asian countries which received foreign capital mostly intermediated
through  the  domestic banking system or lent directly to  the corporate sector (in the form  of
bonds, loans and short term paper) became more vulnerable tham countries which had received
34mostly flows in the form of FDI. 2 "  Three factors were important: implicit insurance provided to
financial institutions; high domestic finding  costs and market segmentation; and certain specific
institutional changes in the 1  990s in some East Asian countries.
- Implicit Insurance. The (implicit or explicit) insurance on liabilities provided by the
government  to the  financial system, as well as implicit guarantees provided to  the corporate
sector has been an important factor in motivating excessive risk-taking, including large foreign
exchange risks (McKinnon and Pill, 1997, provide an analytical model).  As some of the cost of a
default  of  an  individual borrower  (or the negative impact of  a  general  financial crisis  on a
borrower)  were  expected to  be  passed  on to  the  rest  of the  domestic  economy,  risks were
underpriced.  This happened in case of Chile in the late 1  970s, in Mexico in the early 1  990s, and
has been an important factor, especially in the case of Thailand and Korea.
- High Domestic Funding Costs and Market Segmentation. A decomposition of the
nominal lending rate for non-prime borrowers for Thailand over the period 1991-1996 shows that
domestic  financial intermediation costs  accounted for  a significant part of the  nominal  Baht
interest cost: almost 28% of the average nominal interest rate. 22 Individual bank data confirm
that overall intermediation costs, as measured by net intermediation margins, were high in East
Asia. As  a result, domestic costs of funds were significantly higher offshore costs even after
taking into account exchange rate risks, leading to (further) incentive to access foreign funds.
Typically, however, this access was only available to the largest and best credit corporates and
financial institutions, while smaller and less creditworthy firms were confined to the domestic
market.  This market segmentation, not uncommon in other countries, made it more difficult to
limit offshore borrowings to prudent levels as it in effect created a strong constituency favoring a
regime with implicit insurance and other distortions.
- Specific  Institutional  Changes.  Specific  institutional  changes  played  a  role  in
encouraging  foreign inflows.  Important  among these was the creation of  offshore  financial
markets  where  local  financial  institutions  were  to  provide  clients  in  nearby  countries  with
financial  services.  Malaysia promoted,  for  example, Labuan  as  a  financial  center,  and  the
Philippines developed an offshore Euro-peso market.  These markets were often given regulatory
and tax advantages over domestic markets.  Because of the regulatory and tax advantages, much
external financing was channeled through these centers. 24 They also put pressures to reform and
deregulate local markets, as firms would otherwise switch to tlhe offshore market. The offshore
markets created, however, adverse dynamics, mainly as they ended up servicing domestic  firns
("out-in"  transactions)  rather  than  firms  in  nearby  countries  ("out-out"  transactions).  Put
differently, the offshore centers became vehicles for funding doimestic  firms, rather than vehicles
21 Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1997 confirm this finding for a wider set of countries.
22 Macro and currency risk factors constituted 16% of the total of the average nominal interest rate of 16% over this
period, while the base US risk-free rate represented on average 28% of the nominal interest costs.
23  The net financing gain in unclear, however, as it depends on the degree of substitutability: if foreign or domestic
investment simply moves from the domestic market to the offshore market, there will be no net financing gain and
only a loss of tax and regulatory coverage.
35to provide financial services regionally, and encouraged more offshore borrowings.  This bias
was most severe in Thailand (see Box 111.2).
Box H11.2  Offshore  Centers:  The Case  of Thailand 25
Thailand's Bangkok  International  Banking  Facility  (BIBF)  setup and special  incentives  contributed  to a great
degree to the crisis.  In March 1993,  permnission  was given to 46 (domestic  and foreign) commercial  banks to
operate international  banking  business in Bangkok. In 1994  further  privileges  were granted to BIBF-based  banks,
including  the right to open branches  outside Bangkok  and issue negotiable  CDs.  Due to special incentives,  the
BIBF  provided  an important  channel for the domestic  financial  sector to raise short-term  funds ("out-in" lending).
Because  of bilateral  tax treaties  between  Japan and Thailand,  Japanese  banks  could offset withholding  taxes levied
on foreign exchange  borrowings  by Thai companies  against their other income in Japan.  As a result, Japanese
banks,  which  had about  one-quarter  of the BIBF-market,  were willing  to absorb  the withholding  tax and lend at very
low  spreads  to Thai companies.
The supply of funds was further  boosted  by the incentive  for foreign  BIBFs  to become  full bank branches,  the
approval of which was made dependent on the volume of loans.  Historically  low international  interest rates,
especially  on Japanese Yen, were another factor in the large financing  available  and low spreads charged. As a
result, out-in lending  boomed  between 1993  and 1996  (from 126  billion  Baht to 331 billion  Baht).  Reflecting  the
rapid growth of BIBF out-in lending,  Thai commercial  banks' foreign  currency  loans rose at the end of 1996  to
$31.5  billion,  or 17%  of private  sector  loans,  while commercial  banks' short-term  external  liabilities  surged.
Insufficient Risk Pricing and Due Diligence.  Foreign investors not always price risks
adequately or perform full proper due diligence of countries or individual borrowers.  At times,
risks appear to be overestimated and spreads react too rapidly to events; at other times, excessive
appetite for emerging markets' assets leads to an underestimation of risks and too low spreads.
Eichengreen and Mody (1997), for example, find that changes in observable issuer characteristics
do not provide an adequate explanation for changes over time in the volume of new bond issues and
launch spreads.  In important periods, such as the wake of the Mexican crisis, blanket shifts in
market sentiment play the dominant role in increasing spreads. They also note that the first half of
1997 saw a period of large-scale bond issues by emerging market borrowers and dramatic spread
compression, with no obvious changes in fundamentals. Similarly.,  Cline and Barnes (1997) show
that spreads for emerging markets after the Mexican peso crisis fell by more than can be explained
by the upgrading of emerging markets' economies by rating agencies or improved fundamentals.
They find that the unweighted spread on sovereign issues of 14 emerging markets would have been
about  245 basis  points  in the second  quarter  of  1997 if the statistical  relationship  between  spreads
and economic  perfornance  would  have been the same as it was over the  1992-96 period.  In reality,
the average  spread  was  130 basis  points.  By this  test, more  than  half of the decline  in spreads  in
early-1997  was attributable  to rising  capital  supply,  including  undlerestimation  of risk, rather  than
improved  country  fundamentals.26
25  See  also Kawai  and Iwatsubo,  1998.
26 Comparing  the evolution  of the difference  between  the average  spread  on emerging  markets'  EBrady  bonds  with  that
on high-yield  corporate  bonds  in the US  confirms  this. While  the difference  had been  as high  as 300  basis  points,  in
1997  the difference  declined  sharply  and in mid-July  the Brady  bond  spread  even  fell  below  that  on high-yield
corporate  bonds.
36Spreads for non-sovereign borrowers in East Asian countries, which were already lower
than for other emerging markets, declined relatively even faster than those for borrowers from
other emerging  markets during  1990s. Spreads for many borrowers in East Asian countries in
late 1  996/early 1997 were only marginally above those for long-maturity loans to US corporates.
This increased appetite for Asian emerging markets was accompanied by poor due diligence: as
late as May  1997, for example, investors were buying large amounts of short-term paper from
Indonesian corporates with only a few days of due diligence.
The dimensions along which countries became vulnerable
The reinforcing effects of high and rising investment levels, large private capital inflows
and asset  booms, combined with underlying weaknesses, led to the buildup of vulnerabilities
along a number of dimensions: widening current account deficits and slowdowns in productivity
growth; and increased banking fragility associated with lending booms, increased  exposure to
risky sectors, and increased maturity and currency mismatches.  These effects were reinforced by
macroeconomic policies and  reinforced each other as well. There were, however,  differences
among countries that played important roles in both triggering a crisis and in its evolution once
underway.
Widening  current  account  deficits and  slowdowns  in  productivity  growth.  The
widening of the current account deficits need not have been unsustainable, and some countries
such as Chile, Singapore and Thailand itself, have sustained high current account deficits over a
long period of time.  But the current account deficits were progressively reflecting investments
that were of uncertain quality.  Whereas in the late 1980s, the surge in investment was directed
primarily towards tradables, and in particular the export sector, there was a large shift in the mid-
1990s towards non-traded  activities, particularly  in  Thailand and  Indonesia.  This  shift  was
associated with lower overall productivity, although levels of productivity remained high relative
to other regions (Sarel, 1997). Incremental capital output ratios (ICORs) rose sharply during the
1  990s in all countries following a general pattern of decline in the second half of the 1  980s.  The
rise in  ICORs was  in part due to  the exceptionally high  rates of investment, but  likely  also
occurred because many large investments were not subject to market discipline and supported by
explicit or implicit guarantees or financing.  In Korea, where most investments remained largely
geared towards the tradable sectors, excessive expansion occurred in some sectors, for example,
the automobile and steel sectors.
Increasing Banking Fragility.  Banks and NBFIs became more vulnerable to economic
shocks over this period for two main reasons: by lending to sectors or firms whose debt service
capacity was particularly susceptible to  shocks; and by  reducing their own capacity to absorb
negative shocks, especially by exacerbating currency and maturity mismatches and  by under-
provisioning for future potential losses.
- Lending  booms  Financial  liberalization,  through  decreasing  reserve  requirements,
resulting increases in financial savings and the surges in foreign capital inflows, led throughout
East Asia to  increases in  monetary aggregates.  In turn  increased liquidity and  monetization
resulted in a generalized surge in bank and NBFI lending, although the amplitude and duration of
37these cycles, as well as their apparent  relationship  with financial  liberalization  and the surge in
capital inflows, varied  from country  to country. For example,  in Malaysia,  the Philippines  and
Thailand,  bank and non-bank  credit to the private sector began growing  at higher rates and on a
sustained  basis following  the surge in capital inflows. This high growth rate strained banks in
their capacity to properly screen and assess risk of borrowers and projects.  In Korea and
Indonesia, in contrast,  the growth in bank and non-bank  credit to the private sector was lower
during  the inflow  period  than in the years  prior to the surge in fore:ign  capital  (Figure III.  10).
Figure I11.10
Credit  growth  as a  ratio  of GDP  growth  (annual  averages)
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Source:  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics.  Rates of growth  are  calculated  on an annual  basis  and in real terms.
The rising fragility was not detected during the lending booms as the growth in banks'
loan  portfolios  was accompanied  by rising measured  profits. Figure  III.  11 shows  that in countries
in  which credit growth was high-except  the  Philippines-there  was an  increase in  the
profitability of the banking sector, consistently  across all indicators.  Conversely,  in countries
where the lending boom was smaller-in  absolute terms or proportional  to GDP-profitability
tended  to show  a small increase,  or even  a decrease  depending  on the profitability  indicator  used.
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- Increased Exposure to Risky Sectors.  Real estate lending was high and the banking
sector exposure to real estate was greater in countries where the growth of credit was larger than
proportional to GDP growth (Figure 111.12). It should be noted that data on real estate lending
are not comparable across countries and in several countries likely underestimate the exposure of
the banking system to the real estate sector (e.g., as loans to  developers are not classified  as
lending for real estate).  But, there were significant differences among countries.  Korean banks,
for example, did not have large property exposure.  Korean banks did, however, increase the
share of bonds and other securities in their portfolios to almost 20% (in addition, Korean banks
extended  large  amounts of  guarantees  on  securities  issued  by  corporates).  Except  for  the
Philippines, countries increased their exposure to bonds and other securities (see figure 111.  12).
Figure 111.12
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39Both real estate market and securities markets have been very volatile in East Asia.  Real
estate price fluctuations during the 1  990s were the highest in Philippines and Malaysia, with ratio
of highest to lowest prices since inflows started of 3 and 2, respectively.  Still, in both countries,
vacancy rates in 1996 were relatively low at around 2% (and the banking sector exposure to real
estate appeared to be low in the Philippines).  In Thailand and Irndonesia,  the variability of real
estate prices was lower, with high to low ratios of 1.25 and 1.32, respectively.  In both countries,
vacancy rates  in  1996 were relatively  high  at around  14% and  increasing. The  space under
construction in Southeast Asia at the end of 1996 already suggested a significant oversupply of
real estate during 1997-99, especially in Thailand (Figure III.13).
Figure 111.13  Real Estate Office Supply and Vacancy Rates
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- Increased  Foreign Exchange Exposure. Especially  iin Thailand, Malaysia  and  the
Philippines there was a significant increase in foreign exchange exposures of banks since the late
1980s (Figure 111.14). Also, for Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, there was a very rapid
increase  in  the  stock  of foreign  liabilities of NBFIs.  In  Indonesia, the  increase  of  foreign
exchange exposure of banks was significant up to 1994, and was followed by a small decrease,
40but the overall exposure was small.  Commercial banks in Korea did not show any increase in
foreign exchange  exposure during this period, but merchant banks in Korea did increase their
foreign exchange exposures significantly.
Figures 11I.14 Foreign exchange exposures in the banking system
(Ratio (%) of foreign  exchange  liabilities  to foreign  exchange  assets)
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- Maturity Mismatches Vulnerability also emerged in maturity mismatches, especially
on the external financing side.  With the exception of Indonesia, initial levels of external debt
were low in East Asia by international standards (Figure Il1.  15). The accumulation of short-term
external liabilities over the  1991-1996 period, however, was rapid and most of this borrowing
went unhedged (Figure III. 16).  Short-term foreign liabilities of banks grew extremely rapidly in
Thailand, Philippines, Korea and Malaysia.  While short-term foreign liabilities of Indonesian
banks did not increase rapidly, that of corporates did.  The crisis itself has revealed that short-
term borrowings were even higher than these figures suggest as much non-bank  liabilities and
borrowing escaped national and BIS coverage.
41Figure 111.15
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The most telling indicator of vulnerability was the ratio of short-term external debt to
external reserves  prior  to  the crisis  (Figure  FII.17).  It  shows that  short-term debt  exceeded
external reserves by a large margin for Korea, Thailand and Indonesia in June  1997, exceeding
that for many other developing countries.  This high ratio of  short-term obligations  to liquid
foreign exchange assets made these countries much more vulnerable to a potential run on their
currencies in the face of a loss of investor confidence. See also Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996
and Radelet and Sachs, 1986.
42Figure III.17
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Growing  Investor  Concerns  Against  this  backdrop  of  growing  vulnerability,
developments in  1996 and early  1997 led to growing concerns on the part of investors.  First,
Thailand saw a sharp deterioration in export performance. After having averaged over  14% in
real terms during 1990-95, Thailand's  export growth turned negative in 1996. At the same time,
Thailand saw its real exchange rate appreciate by about  10% during  1996.  The bulk  of this
appreciation was due to an appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate, which, in turn,
reflected fluctuations between the US dollar (which Thailand was in effect targeting) and the
currencies of Thailand's  other trading partners, notably Japan.  Using competitor weights,  the
appreciation in Thailand's  real exchange rate was even larger at 15 percent.  Moreover, the fact
that the other East Asian countries also saw an appreciation in their real exchange rates  after
1995 and  a  concurrent  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  their  exports,  led  to  investor  concerns
regarding the region's  competitiveness generally.
Export growth-which  had been very strong during the  1990s in the other South East
Asian  countries  as  well-decelerated  sizably  in  1996, albeit much  less than  in  the  case of
Thailand. Malaysia saw a slowdown in export growth from an average of 14% per annum during
1990-95 to 5% in 1996, and Indonesia saw a slowdown from an average of 8% per annum to 5%
(Figure III.18).  In case of Korea, exports slumped in  1996--in  large part due to  a decline in
terms of trade as a result of a glut in the global electronics markets that resulted in a sharp fall in
prices, but were growing at a rate of 15% in mid-1997.  And export receipts during the same
period increased by about 20% in case of the Philippines.
43Ex-post analysis shows that the slowdown in world demand can explain a large part of
the  slowdown  in the  region's  export growth  (Bhattacharya, Gihosh and  Janisen, 1998).  The
slowdown in the growth of export markets was greatest for Indonesia at over 6 percent.  The
growth  of  Malaysia's  export  markets  slowed by  around  5 percentage  points,  while that  of
Thailand slowed by just  over 4 percentage points.  In case of Malaysia and to an even larger
extent Thailand, the exchange rate appreciation was also a significant factor.  Nonetheless, it is
true that the slowdown in these countries' export performance was greater than what  could be
expected based on the slowdown in export market growth and real exchange rate appreciation
alone.
Two additional factors could have accounted for this difference: the global downturn in
demand for some specific products in 1996 such as semiconductors; and, growing competition
from low cost producers.  A detailed analysis of the top ten exports of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand  (Bhattacharya,  Ghosh  and  Jansen,  1998) suggests that  in  the  more  recent  period,
increases in China's  market shares were accompanied by declines in market shares in their top
ten products,  especially  in the  case of  Thailand.  By  contrast, during  1989-92, increases  in
China's  world market shares were not associated with declines in world market shares in these
products for the three countries.  All three countries, however, have increased their share of more
skill intensive products as China's  share in their traditional exports increased during the  1990s.
And although there has been a  deceleration in the pace at which their  world market share of
manufactured exports has grown, these countries have continued to increase world market share
in total exports of manufactures.
This analysis suggests that the deterioration in the region's  export performance and the
implications for future competitiveness were not as severe as the market may have assessed them
to  be.  However, the real exchange rate  appreciation and export slowdown  were  likely very
important  in  affecting  investor  perceptions.  Increasingly,  investors  began  to  focus  on  the
misalignment  of  exchange  rate  in  Thailand.  Following  prolonged  poor  policy  reaction  in
Thailand, the crisis was then triggered.
IV.  Evolution, the Role of Contagion and the Depth of the Crisis
Onset and Evolution of the Crisis
- Thailand. There was a lag of almost a year between the onset of confidence weakening
and vigorous policy reaction.  Equity investors were the first to withdraw.  The stock market,
which had peaked in February 1996, had already fallen by 40% by early 1997, with equity prices
of financial institutions falling by even more, a cumulative 60 percent. Capital flows in  1996
were increasingly in the form of short-term debt as financial institutions and some corporates had
difficulty  obtaining  longer  maturity  funding.  Several  large  investments  ran  into  difficulty
obtaining financing as early as 1996, notably Alphatec, a large iabout $1 billion) semi-conductor
investment with weak economic prospects.  In early 1997, total private capital flows started to
slow down, with bond issues and syndicated loans falling in thte first half of 1997 to $4 billion,
compared to $6.5 billion in the first half of 1996. Confidence in Thailand was further reduced by
the default on a Eurobond issue of Somprasong Land.
44External factors played a role in the build-up of pressures in 1996 and early- 1997 through
the cyclical  slowdown in  world trade, problems in  the world  semiconductor market,  and the
appreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the yen. The sharp export slowdown in 1996 slowed down the
asset price  (especially property prices) inflation that had been underway  for several  years  in
Thailand.  Credit  rating agencies  issued  some warnings as  early  as mid-1996  and  Moody's
downgraded  Thailand's  short-tern  debt on  September  4,  1996. Credit  rating  agencies  put
Thailand on  notice for possible  further review in  early  1997 and on  April  10, 1997 Moody
downgraded Thailand to A3 from A2.  IBCA, a credit rating agency for banks, however, did not
change its ratings of Thai banks throughout this period, hoviever, and as late as March  1997, it
said it was maintaining the rating for the six leading Thai banks.  And S&P reaffirmed its rating
of Thailand as late as July 1997.
After periodic speculative attacks in 1996, the Thai Baht came under renewed pressure in
late  January  and  early February  1997.  As  before, the central bank  was able  to  defend the
currency  through  spot  and  forward  sales  and  increases  in  interest  rates.  The  market's
expectations of an exchange rate devaluation had increased, however, both  directly, as export
growth was still minimal, and indirectly as it became less likely that the Bank of Thailand would
sustain a prolonged period of high interest rates.  The unwillingness, c.q. inability to adjust the
exchange  rate  in  the  face of  overwhelming  perceptions  oif overvaluation  in  the  Spring  led,
however, to a decline in official foreign exchange reserves, required a hefty increase in interest
rates and postponed any beneficial impact on the export sector.  Similarly, the unwillingness to
tackle the weaknesses in the financial system, and the lack of transparency on the extent of the
problem, compounded difficulties and led to negative reaction on the part of markets.
In May, the pressure on the currency reemerged in full force and the government had to
resort  to  using  exchange  controls  to  stem  the  loss  of  foreign  exchange.  Effectively,  the
authorities segmented on May  15 the resident and non-residLent  borrowings of Baht, driving a
wedge between the local and offshore markets for Baht.  However, the measure failed to restore
confidence-they  actually may have led to a greater loss of confidence, also as weaknesses in the
financial sector mounted. These weaknesses in the financial system ultimately made the attack on
the currency  successful, because they precluded  the Bank of  Thailand from pursuing  a high
interest rate policy to defend the currency.
In  the meantime,  loan portfolios of banks  and  othe:r finance  companies  continued  to
deteriorate in quality and increase in riskiness as property price increases stagnated, and asset-
liability  maturity  and  currency  mismatches  grew.  Liquidity  problems  in  many  finance
companies  increased and the stock of liquidity support from the Bank of Thailand to finance
companies amounted to about 10% of GDP in early August, with much of it accumulated during
the period May-June.  Concerns mounted about the delayed and weak policy responses on the
part of the government in dealing with the financial sector weaknesses.  In June and July, the
Thai Baht again came under sustained pressure. On June 27, 1997 the Bank of Thailand closed
16 struggling finance companies, but markets considered this "too little, too late".
45After losing another $4 billion in foreign exchange  reserves (making for a cumulative
loss over January  to July of $12 billion),  and incurring  a $23 billion forward  position, the Thai
authorities  finally  let the exchange  float on July 2. The misalignment  of the exchange  rate, given
the slowdown  in exports and financial  sector  weaknesses,  meant that the real exchange  rate had
to  depreciate.  The financial fragility implied that it was the nominal exchange rate that
ultimately  moved as the authorities  had lost other degrees of freedom. And Thailand's large
short-term indebtedness  meant that, once the exchange  rate moved, the exchange rate had to
move substantially  to equilibrate  demand  for foreign  and domestic  assets.  The currency  therefore
immediately depreciated  by about 10% against the dollar relative to May levels, and fell by
another 8% in the following  two weeks.
- Other East Asian countries. The Thailand crisis focused attention of markets on the
vulnerability  of  other  Southeast  Asian  countries,  notably  their  macroeconomic  conditions,
weaknesses in their financial sectors, concerns about the political situation and commitment to
reform,  and  their  future  prospects  in  general.  Large, short-term  maturity  foreign exchange
borrowings exposed several of the countries to "bank-runs" as problems in the financial and real
sectors accumulated to too high levels for investors'  comfort.  As investors reassessed countries,
in  quick  succession,  Indonesia, Malaysia and  the Philippines  were  drawn  in  as  foreign and
domestic investors rebalanced positions.  Unlike Thailand, the other Southeast Asian countries
stopped intervening relatively quickly and abandoned their (implicit) exchange rate peg or band
in the face of foreign exchange losses.  Philippines floated its currency on July 12.  Indonesia
initially widened its band from  8% to  12% immediately following the float of the Philippines
peso and then floated the currency on August 14 in the face of some foreign exchange losses.
Malaysia stopped defending its exchange rate in mid-July after some foreign exchange losses.
Taiwan  stopped  intervening  to  support  its  exchange  rate  on  October  17  and  it  currency
depreciated by about 7% in the following weeks.  Singapore and Hong Kong also came under
pressure, with  Hong Kong  successfully fighting  off attacks  on  its  pegged exchange  rate  by
speculators while Singapore let its currency depreciate (Table IN'.  1).
46Table  IV.1 Exchange  Rates and Stock Prices  for East Asian,
Latin American  and other  Countries
(1997,  % changes)
Stock Market  Stock Market (July-  Exchange Rate
(Jan-June)  Dec)  (July-Dec)
East  Asia
Indonesia  14  -45  -122
Malaysia  -13  -45  -53
Philippines  -II  -34  -50
Thailand  -37  -29  -93
China  36  -17  0
Korea  14  -51  -80
Latin  America
Argentina  25  -16  0
Brazil  79  -22  -4
Chile  10  -16  -6
Colombia  23  19  -19
Mexico  33  16  -2
Peru  40  -13  -3
Venezuela  36  -9  -3
Others
India  31  -15  -9
South Africa  I  1  -16  -7
Czech Republic  -9  0  -7
Turkey  65  54  -39
Russia  129  -3  -3
Stock  markets  fell  sharply  in  all  East Asian  countries  throughout  the  fall  of  1997.
Although Thailand posted initially modest gains in the wake of the initial devaluation, the Thai
stock market fell further and was at a record low at the end of 1997 (in dollar terms more than
80%  lower  than  the  peak  reached  in  early  1996).  The  other  Southeast countries  suffered
somewhat lower declines in their stock markets, with drops in dollar terms as of end  1997 of
between 50% and 60% for the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia since early-1996.  Malaysia
announced the establishment of a large fund to support the stock market, but this  did little to
support the markets (and was scaled back substantially later).
After moving to floating exchange rates, governments in all countries tightened domestic
liquidity.  The most  stringent response came from Bank Indonesia, which  imposed very tight
liquidity for several weeks (including through moving about Rupiah 10 trillion (about  10% of
reserve money) of  state enterprise deposits  from commercial banks to  the central  bank)  and
closed the discount window.  Overnight interest rates were in excess of 100% during the second
half  of  August,  but  eased  later  to  about  35%, and  the  discount  window  was  (selectively)
reopened.  In the case of the Philippines, the increase was less, but interest rates rose above 25%
after reserve requirements were raised in late August.  Later in the year, interest rates in the
Philippines fell somewhat.  In Thailand interest rates were about 20% in late fall.  Malaysia was
the exception, as it did not raise interest rates very much and rates continued to be in the range of
7.5%  - 8% during  most of the fall.
47All  four  countries  introduced  new  restrictions  on  foreitgn exchange  transactions  by
attempting  to  deny  speculators the domestic  credit needed to  establish  a  net  short domestic
currency  position.  As  noted,  the  Thai  authorities  limited  the  sale  of  Baht  for  dollars  to
nonresidents  in the  spot  foreign exchange  market for  speculative purposes  in  May.  In  the
Philippines, the central bank prohibited local banks from engaging in  forward contracts  with
offshore banks for a period of three months.  In Malaysia, authorit:ies  imposed restrictions on the
sale of ringgit to nonresidents other than for commercial reasons.  It temporarily prohibited short
sales in the stock market, but was forced to lift this restriction in the wake of large sell-offs by
foreign investors.  In Indonesia, banks were prohibited to extend credit to nonresidents for swap
transactions.  In January  1997, the Thai authorities eliminated the restrictions and thus unified
the on-shore and offshore markets for Baht.
- Korea and other countries.  Spillover effects were not  limited to Southeast Asia.  The
stock market in the US and some emerging markets were negatively affected by news from Asia.
On Oct. 23, the Australian dollar fell by 11 percent, and on Oct. 27, following weak markets in
Hong Kong  and  the rest  of Asia,  the Dow  Jones Industrial  average dropped  554  points  (7
percent), its largest absolute point drop ever. Vulnerable emerging markets outside the region,
including  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico  and  Russia  also  came  uader  pressures  and  needed  to
increase local interest rates to support their currency and take steps to reduce risks.  In October,
Korea was affected by the crisis as it lost market confidence and was no longer able to attract
sufficient amounts of new credits and roll-over its existing obligations.
This foreign exchange liquidity crunch followed a year in which bankruptcies of Korean
chaebols had mounted, starting with the default of Hanbo in January 1997, and followed by Kia
Motors and Sammi Steel.  The defaults were the result of low profitability  for several years.
Korean companies'  profit margins had been shrinking for several. years, as Korean chaebols had
been on ambitious expansion and diversification drives without regard for economic profitability
(the profit margin  (profit over sales) for the top  30 chaebols in  1996 was only 0.2%).  This
included numerous  overseas investment projects and a concerted drive into the electronic  and
semiconductor sectors in  both  domestic  markets and  in emerging  markets  of East  Asia, the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The number of overseas investment projects rose to
well over 2000 projects per  year and Korean outward FDI  amounted to  about $2.5 billion  in
1996.  Low profitability forced chaebols to borrow, from both domestic and foreign sources, in
order  to  maintain  operations.  For  example,  debt  obligations  in  the  manufacturing  sector
accounted for over 47% of total assets and the average debt equity ratio was over 300% by the
end of 1996. Key corporate financial ratios deteriorated further in 1997.
Following  the  inability  of  domestic  banks  to  rollover  short-term  external  debts  in
October, the Korean won depreciated by about 85% in a two-month period and real interest rates
rose to about 30%.  The country faced an extraordinary liquidity crunch arising from the scale of
short-debt falling due and the difficulties in rolling over this debt.  More than half of Korea's
external debt was short-debt, of which about $20 billion fell due in the last two months of 1997.
As for the other East Asian countries, the lack of willingness among foreign creditors to extend
new credit  stemmed from the concerns over the health  of Korea's  financial systems  and the
48strength and competitiveness of its industrial sector.  Political uncertainty related to presidential
elections in December added to investors' concerns
The  extent  of the fallout  of the Thai Baht  crisis was  surprisingly  large, as  there  are
substantial differences among countries.  The size of the current account deficits and the degree
of short-term funding differed among the countries, with Thailand standing out as having a very
skewed funding structure.  Reserve cushions and external debt ratios also differed substantially.
In terms of export performance, there were substantial differences.  The degree of weaknesses in
the financial systems also differed with Thailand more extreme in terms of the size of the lending
boom, the  currency and maturity mismatch of lending, and the concentration of the  banking
portfolio in the real estate sector.  In other countries, notably the Philippines, the magnitude and
duration of the lending boom had been smaller.  In Indonesia and Malaysia there was much less
recourse by the financial sector to short-term external borrowing to expand lending (in Indonesia
lending by corporates was large, however).  However, increased lending for real estate was a
common feature of all the countries.  There were also differences in the speed and consistency of
policy responses.  While the tight liquidity conditions put pressures on many of the region's
financial institutions,  only  Thailand provided extensive  liquidity support to  ailing  banks  and
corporates on a large scale prior to the crisis.
- Large comovement in asset  prices. Lack of similarities notwithstanding,  there  has
been considerable comovement in asset prices across the region.  Exchanges rates have been
under similar pressure in all countries.  Figure IV.  I provides the movement in exchange rates for
the four South East Asian countries and Korea.  The figure shows that Malaysia, the Philippines,
and  Thailand  experienced  simultaneously  large  exchange  rates  depreciations.  In  case  of
Indonesia,  the decline  of the  exchange rate  was even more  severe, while  in  case  of Korea
exchange  rate  declines  started  in  October and  was very  large  in  November  and  December.
Declines were much less strong in case of Taiwan (ROC) and Singapore and even less for China
and Hong Kong.  But nevertheless, correlations between movements in exchange rates of the
four  Southeast Asian countries during  the period  August-February were  very  high  and  even
higher  in  the  period  October to  early  January.  Since mid.-January, there  has  been  less  of
comovement in exchange rates as the Malaysia ringgit, the Korean won and the Thai Baht have
appreciated somewhat while the Indonesian rupiah has further depreciated.
49Figure IV.1  Index of exchange rate movements, June 97-April 98
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Secondary  market  spreads  on  sovereign  bonds  saw  very  similar  and  simultaneous
movements for most East Asian countries during this period.  While until July spreads for most
East Asian countries had been close to  100 basis points, with the exception of the Philippines
which  was  closer  to  200  basis  points,  in  the  Fall  spreads  for  East  Asian  countries  rose
simultaneously very sharply (Figure IV.2).  In case of Indonesia,,  the spread rose to more than
600 basis points in December, while spreads for the Philippines and Thailand rose above 400
basis points.  Since then spreads have declined, and were in April 1  998 about 300 basis points for
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and 350 basis points for Korea.  Country differences have
also become more pronounced.  In case of Indonesia, the spread fell somewhat in late 1997, but
has since increased to about 750 basis points, and was in April 1998 about 530 basis points.
50Figure IV.2 Secondary  market  spreads  on sovereign  debt
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Prior to  the crisis, stock markets among South East Asian countries did not show
extraordinary comovement.  As  noted,  the  stock price  in  Thailand had  more  or  less
monotonously  experienced  a decline since January 1996, cumulating  to a loss of about 65% in
real local currency  terms by June 1997.  Between  January and June 1997, the Philippines  and
Malaysia  had also experienced  a decline in their stock markets,  but of smaller magnitude,  while
Indonesia  and Korea still registered  increases  in their stock markets  of about 10%.  Following
the July 2 Thai crisis, the Thailand  stock market  initially  rebounded  strong,  with a 25% increase
in July. In the rest of East Asia, stock  prices declined  modestly  during July.  The comovement
among stock  prices in the region increased  greatly,  however,  in August,  as stock  prices in South
East Asian countries  fell by about 25% and prices in Korea and Hong Kong declined (Figure
IV.3).  September  saw a period of consolidation,  with little change in stock prices across the
region. During the period from mid-November  to mid-January  stock market declines continued
in East Asia, with the exception  of China  and Taiwan  (ROC).
51Figure IV.3 Real local stock prices: July 1997 -February 1998
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Note: Stock  prices in local currency  have been  deflated  by using  CPI-indexes.
Between mid-January and April  1998 markets rebounded strongly in  nost  East Asian
countries, with gains in domestic currency between 30% to 43%, and even more in dollar terms.
The exception has been Indonesia, where, after an initial gain, prices fell sharply  after early
February.  Cumulative over  the period  since July  2,  1997 to  mid-February,  however,  stock
markets in East Asia have in local currency terms declined between 23% (the Philippines) and
44% (Korea).  The exceptions have been China and Taiwan, ROC.
Reflecting  the strong  comovement during  certain periods,  correlations between  stock
prices in East Asia and in other emerging markets were at times very high.  While before July 2,
the average correlation among 22 major emerging markets was about  10%, during the crisis
period the average correlation increased to about 20% over the period July  1997 to February
1998.  During the  October to  mid-November period, correlations among these  22 emerging
markets were on average close to 30%, and within regions correlalions amnong  stock prices were
even higher.  Between the Philippines and Malaysia, for example, the correlation was 16% in the
year before the crises, but rose to 29% during the crisis, and was 59% during the October to min-
November period.  In case of Argentina and Brazil, the correlation was 44% in the year before
the crises, but rose to 75% during the crisis, and was 84% during ithe  October to mid-November
period.
52- Contagion  or similarity  in changes in  fundamentals? Whether or not  these  large
comovements  in  asset  prices reflect  contagion, that  is  pure  spillover, or  are  in  part  due  to
similarities in changes in underlying fundamentals is difficult to tell (see further Valdes,  1996).
Asset prices reflect market  expectations of future real returns, which depends on expectations
about fundamental economic variables and the market perception of risks and it willingness to
absorb risk.  Both expected fundamentals and risks have likely changed in similar ways for all
East Asian countries during this period due to a number of factors: the trade linkages between
countries meant that declines in demand or imports in one country led to decline in exports in
other countries. The competitiveness of one country was affected as a result of exchange rate
depreciation  of  other countries  ("competitive  devaluations"),  thus  negatively  affecting future
exports  prospects.  Financial  linkages  between two  countries,  including  through  FDI,  bank
lending, and capital market activities, meant that events in one country have negatively affected
another country (see Calvo and Reinhart, 1995, for evidence for Latin America).  Countries may
have  been  affected  by  the  occurrence  of  a  similar  external  shock  (e.g.,  global  economic
slowdown or events in Japan).  And events in one country may have led market participants to
revise their model of development more broadly, and thus have affected asset prices in a larger
group of countries.
Some positive correlation between asset prices can thus be expected and does not "prove"
contagion.  One needs to define "normal" and "excessive" correlations, where normal is based on
some "model" which relates to fundamentals and risk perceptions and preferences. Many of these
fundamentals are difficult to  capture, however, particular in a  rapidly changing environment.
There are nevertheless some indicators where one may expectl  that differences in fundamentals
will show  up.  One indication is whether declines in  aggregate stock markets depend on the
sectoral composition of listed stocks.  Specifically, one would expect stock markets dominated
by  firms  producing  tradables  to  have  declined  less  than  stock  markets  dominated  by
nontradables, particularly stocks of financial institutions, since the currency depreciations should
have led to an increased foreign demand for tradables, but not for nontradables. To the degree
that this is the case, it would provide some evidence for rational discrimination between markets
by investors, and thus argue against simple contagion.  Likewise, if declines in asset prices can
be  differentiated by risk factors between countries, e.g., the degree of external  indebtedness,
some indirect evidence exist that markets act rationale.
A full-fledged analysis still remains to be done (see Kaminsky and Schmukler 1998, for
some  initial  results).  Evidence to  date  suggests, however,  that  there  have been  periods  of
excessive comovement, particularly in the October to mid-November period.  Cline and Barnes
(1997) observe, for example, that the run-up in spreads in late October for emerging markets was
beyond what  could be explained by historical relationships.  While the average spread for  14
emerging markets  economies stood at about 260 basis points  at the end of October, this was
above the level predicted by the 1992-96 statistical relationship of spreads to economic variables.
In other periods, it appears that markets did discriminate between countries depending on risk
factors and perceptions about commitments to reform.  Spreads declined considerably for Korea,
for example, following the deepening of its reform prograrn with the IMF in late December and
early January, while they rose for Indonesia.
53Trade linkages between countries in the region can explain some, but not all of the
comovements. Intra-regional  exports  among East Asian countries  accounted  for almost 40% of
total exports in 1996,  up from 31.7%  in 1990. If Japan is included  the figure  rises to 51%. These
high levels of intra-regional  trade may have tended to increase the speed and directness of
contagion as a drop in demand for imports in one East Asian country triggered declines in
demand in exports from other countries. While these effects may have been large, the exact
magnitude  of these effects  can, however,  only be ascertained  through  a full econometric  model  of
demand and supply of trade. Changes  in countries' competitiveness  vis-a-vis  third markets as a
result of the depreciations (competitive  devaluations)  appear, in contrast, less likely to have
played  a large role in causing  contagion  (see Box  VI.  1).
Box IV.1 Competitive Devaluations: An Unlikely Cause for Contagion
If the East Asian countries  compete  in the same  export markets,  a devaluation  of one currency  will put competitive
pressures  on other currencies,  which  then may be forced  to devalue  as well  to restore  their competitiveness.  Can the
successive  competitive  devaluations  explain the sharp depreciation  of the currencies? The answer seems  to be no.
We calculate  the realignment  of East Asian  currencies  versus  the dollar  necessary  to restore  the real  exchange  rate  to
its level of June 1995,  under two scenario:  one, that the country  devalues  alone,  and the real competitive  exchange
rate versus  the dollar  of all other  countries  remains  unchanged;  two, that all the five East  Asian  countries  affected  by
the crisis devalue simultaneously.  Box figure I presents  the results of our calculations. If each country  devalues
alone,  the required  depreciations  vary  between  10 and 20 per cent. If all five affected  countries  devalue  at the same
time, required  depreciations  increase  only by one half to one-percentage  points. The difference  between  the two
scenarios  is thus relatively  small,  and competitive  devaluations  appear insufficient  to explain  actual  depreciations.
Box Figure 1.  Actual depreciation versus the dollar, and depreciation needed to bring the real exchange rate
back  to its June 1995  level under  different  assumptions
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V.  Why Has the Crisis  Been So Protracted?
The crisis has been deeper  and wider  than many had anticiipated.  Until early in the Fall,
that is after the Thailand crises had erupted, most observers still predicted relatively robust
growth for most of the region.  The consensus forecast (the average of monthly economic
forecast  from 25 economic  institutions)  until October  for GDP growth in developing  South East
Asian countries  was still above 5%. Since then, growth  forecasts  have been drastically  lowered.
54Consensus forecast for GDP-growth for Korea, for example, fell sharply in a matter of months,
from 6.2% in October to  1.8% in December and -0.1% in January.  Financial markets neither
anticipated events.  Credit ratings for almost all sovereign claims on East Asian countries in June
1997 were the same a year earlier and Thailand was still able to borrow at 90 basis points over
10-year US Treasuries only a few months before its crisis erupted.  On July  1, 1997, spreads for
East Asian countries over 10-year US Treasuries varied between 55 basis points (Korea) and 90
basis points (Hong Kong).  Credit rating agencies only started to downgrade countries late in the
fall, weeks after the crisis had erupted.  Korea was downgraded very  sharply in  a very short
period of time: on October it was rated AA- while on December 22 it was downgraded to below
investment grade status, or down-graded five notches in a period of two months.  After  July,
spreads rose sharply and were for example, 350 basis points for Thailand in early March  1998,
falling to 280 basis points in April.
As confidence in the region fell, foreign investors adopted a wait-and-see approach for
most countries-given  uncertainties on short-term prospects and lack of conviction on their part
on improvements in fundamentals and policy measures.  External financing was sharply reduced
and foreign lenders were even unwilling to rollover short-term loans for trade financing.  The
financing gap was partly filled by official financing, but most of the adjustment came from sharp
contractions in imports.  In case of Korea, trade deficits turned around sharply, to surpluses of
about $3 billion in each month between December and April, largely due to a sharp contraction
in imports.  Since many corporates and banks were unhedged, there was an increased demand for
foreign exchange as these institutions tried to  cover open  positions in  anticipation of  further
depreciation  and  currency  volatility.  These factors  created perceptions  of  further  currency
declines,  thus  increasing  incentives  for  buying  foreign exchange  soon,  and  validating  and
aggravating the  currency  declines.  Because  large  declines  in  currencies  and  tight  liquidity
impaired the balance sheets of both corporates and banks, credit risks increased and downward
spirals  and  continued  weaknesses  in  exchange  rates and  stock  prices resulted  in  almost  all
countries.  In early 1998, the situation stabilized somewhat, and most exchange rates recovered
from their 1997 lows, reflecting reform progress, especially in Korea and Thailand.
Compared to  other recent financial crises, for example, the  1994/5 Mexico crisis,  the
current crisis in East Asia has thus been much more protracted.  In case of Mexico, private flows
recovered in 6 months to about the same level as prior to the crisis.  This does not appear to be
the  case  for any  of  the East  Asian countries.  Figures on  bond and  other capital  markets'
instruments show that private flows have virtually come to a standstill.  Stock markets have also
fallen  much deeper than  in case of  the Mexico crisis.  East Asian  countries'  stock  markets
amplitude and severity of stock markets' boom and bust cycle had in the past been less than that
of  emerging markets in  Latin America, and only  slightly more pronounced that  those  in  G7
countries (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1998). In contrast, the drop in stock prices (in dollar terms)
since July  1997 has been much more pronounced than in any previous downturn in East Asia,
and even exceeds that of downturns in most Latin American countries following the Tequila
crisis.  This protracted crisis appears due to two reasons: the structural nature of problems and
associated  coordination issues;  and the high  leverage of  corporates and  the  associated  large
private sector, external exposures.
55- Structural nature of problems and coordination issues. The events in East Asia have
highlighted the nature  of macro-financial crises  in a  financially  more integrated world.  An
important dimension of avoiding a financial crisis-and  of recovering from them-becomes  the
preservation  of  investor  confidence.  Investors,  in  turn,  are  focusing  not  only  on  sound
macroeconomic  fundamentals but  also on the  strength of the  financial system,  on  corporate
governance and competition policy, and on a variety of other structural factors, which underpin
country economic performance.  This has been especially so for East Asia, which difficulties do
not stem from poor macro-fundamentals, but rather from structural deficiencies in the financial
and corporate sectors.
One  implication of this change is that in the immediate a:ftermath of  a financial crisis,
countries are expected to  launch a program comprising both macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reforms.  Indeed, in the recent cases in East Asia, the structural measures announced in
the post-crisis packages which are expected to be implemented over the next few years,  have
been  as  important  as  the  traditional  macroeconomic  elements  in  efforts  to  restore  market
confidence. This emphasis on programs of structural reforms, compared to only macro-economic
stabilization, has  had  a  number of  important implications.  First,  a  set  of  fully  articulated
structural reforms is difficult to design in the middle of a financial crisis, and the political and
economic consensus regarding the set of reforms might be difficult to achieve quickly.  Second,
the structural reform agenda will take  several years to implement, and  results may take  even
more time.  And  third, progress in  implementing structural  issues will  be  more difficult  to
observe and assess.
As a result, while structural issues have been squarely part of the programs to  restore
external investors'  confidence from the very start, the market has had great difficulty assessing
the commitment of the government to these measures and to judge the future impact of actual
policies and decisions taken, particularly during the first phase of crisis management.  When the
importance of structural issues is combined with a diversified strLcture of external financing-
both on the creditor and debtor side-the  potential for coordination problems among creditors
has been large.  In case of East Asia-and  for other emerging  markets, there  is much more
creditor  and  debtor diversity  than was the  case in  other  situations.  During, the  developing
countries' debt servicing problems of the mid-1  980s, for example, all creditor banks were linked
to each  other by cross-default  clauses, making  coordination among  creditors relatively  easy.
Cross-default  clauses are  not  used  for  lending  to  a  diverse  sel  of  corporates  and  financial
institutions.  And whereas  in case of Mexico's  1995 financial crisis, creditors had to  mainly
inform themselves about fiscal and aggregate macro-economic peirformance,  in case of the East
Asian  countries  prospects  for  individual financial  institutions  and  corporates  have  mattered
importantly.
High  leverage.  Financial  depth  is  high  in  East  Asia  as  good  macro-fundamentals
encouraged household savings, most of that were intermediated through the domestic banking
systems.  In contrast, in other financial crises, domestic financial intermediation was low, e.g., in
Mexico domestic credit to GDP was less than 20% in 1996 and in Argentina less than 15%. This
meant that declines in asset prices had more severe effects on domestic financial intermediation
and that business cycle effects were more  severe in the East Asian countries compared  with
56countries  with  low  levels  of  financial intermediation.  Furthermore, in  other  financial  crises,
corporates had  already adjusted themselves to less external financing from domestic  financial
institutions.  In  Mexico, for example, many corporates, especially export-oriented  firms  had
developed  relationships  with  foreign  capital  suppliers  and  were  thus  less  affected  by  the
problems in Mexico's financial sector following the 1995 crisis.  This was generally not the case
in East Asia.
The high level of domestic financial institutions, combined with biases in the financial
systems and culture against equity financing and in favor of debt financing, meant that many
firms in East Asia have been highly leveraged.  The debt equity ratio of Korean corporates, for
example, was almost 450%% by the end of 1996, three time the US ratio, and more than five
times the Taiwanese ratio (Table V.1). The top 30 Korean chaebols had even higher leverage, on
average more than 500% in 1996. Correspondingly, interest burdens are very high in East Asian
countries.  In  Korea,  for  example, the  interest-expenses-to-sales  ratio  of  all  manufacturing
corporations in 1995 was about 6%, compared to 2% for Taiwan and 1% for Japan.  Furthermore,
and reflective of a high expansion rate, East Asian corporates have relatively little liquid assets.
Korean corporates, for example, had a ratio of liquid assets to short term debts of less  100% in
1996. This can be compared to ratios of 150% for the US and about 130% for Japan and Taiwan.
Liquidity and interest rate shocks thus greatly affect East Asian corporates.
Figure V.1 Domestic Credit to GDP
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57Table V.1 Comparison  of Financial  Ratios  of Manufacturing  Companies
Korea  Korea  Germany  USA  Japan  Taiwan
(1996)  (199 7)  (1995)  (1995)  (1995)  (1995)
Debt/Equity  332.7  449.4  175  159.7  206.3  85.7
Source: OECD, Financial Statements of Non-financial Enterprises.
The high leverage means that small shocks to  interest rates of operational cash flow of
corporates will greatly affect their ability to service debts.  As an illustration of this, we use a
sample of 300 firms listed at the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).  Table V.2 shows the high
leverage of Thai firms and their deteriorating profitability.  It also shows the ratios of earnings
before interest and taxes to total interest expenses and the number of Thai firms that were not
able to service their debts in full from their operating income.  The number of these firms rose
from  18 in 1994 to  114 in 1997 and the percent of total loans represented by these firms rose
about  1.4% to  36.4%, i.e., for about one-third of loans, interest  expenses could not  be  fully
covered in 1997 from operating income and had to be rolled-over and financed from new loans.
With the high  leverage, even a small increase in interest rates and decline in profitability have
thus led to a large number of firms running into debt servicing and liquidity problems, which in
turn has negatively affected output.
Table V.2: Deteriorating  Corporate  Performance
Period  Number  Leverage  Profits  Profits  No of  Loans of
of Firms  over  over  firms with  Firms with
Liabilities  Interest  Profits <  Profits <
Expenses  Interest  Interest
Expenses  Expenses
(%)
1997:Q4  356  2.95  7.3  1.49  114  36.4
1997:Q3  356  2.95  10.2  2.59  83  30.8
1997:Q2  357  2.12  N/A.  3.18  71  18.4
1997:Ql  353  2.01  N/A.  3.66  54  16.2
1996:Q4  354  1.90  14.9  3.11  49  11.8
1995:Q4  354  1.67  18.1  4.01  34  7.6
1994:Q4  352  1.50  24.0  5.78  18  1.4
Notes: Profit is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA). Leverage is debt over equity.
Source: SET database.
58VI.  Conclusions
It is clear that the crisis in East Asia has been very different from the debt crisis of the
1980s or even the Mexican  peso crisis of 1994-95. While  the views on what caused the crisis
and its implications  will continue  to chum, this paper draws two preliminary  conclusions  on the
diagnosis  of the problem  and why  its impact  has been  so severe in East Asia.
First, the crisis occurred because the economies did not have the  institutional and
regulatory  s*ructures  to cope with increasingly  integrated  capital  markets.  The immediate  source
of the problems  was private sector decisions,  both on the part of borrowers in East Asia and on
the part of lenders.  But these decisions  were taken in the context of government  policies that
created  incentives  for risky behavior  while simultaneously  exerting  little regulatory  authority  and
not encouraging  enough transparency  to allow the market  to recognize  and correct the problems.
Under-supervised  financial sectors allowed poorly governed  corporations to invest borrowed
money in highly inflated or risky assets such as real estate ventures.  A lack of transparency-in
the form of unreported  mutual guarantees,  lack of disclosure  of companies' and banks' true net
positions,  and insider  relations-masked these poor investments,  and meant that once a downturn
began it  was difficult to  separate good and bad firms. These domestic weaknesses were
aggravated  by undisciplined  foreign  lending.  The problem  was not so much overall  indebtedness,
but the composition  of debt, with a buildup of short-term  unhedged  debt leaving the economies
vulnerable  to a sudden  loss of confidence.
Second,  these same  underlying  factors  have  meant  that the economic  and social impact  of
the crisis has been more severe than some anticipated. The loss of confidence had has an
immediate  and large impact on private demand-both  investment  and consumption-which in
the short run could not be offset by net external demand.  Financial  institutions  and corporates
have been more severely  affected  in East Asia in the aftermnath  of the crisis because of the very
high degree  of leverage  (two to three times that of Latin America),  and the unhedged  and short-
term nature of foreign liabilities. This, in turn, has resulted in a severe external and domestic
liquidity  crunch. Political  uncertainties  have also played  a role, but the erosion of confidence  has
also undermined  political  stability.  Domestic  recession,  financial  and corporate  distress, liquidity
constraints  and political  uncertainty  have  been self-reinforcing,  leading  to a severe downturn.
Although the situation appears to be stabilizing (with the exception of Indonesia), the
impact  of the crisis will be long lasting,  in part because  countries  lack the necessary  mechanisms
for financial  and corporate  restructuring,  including  both the legal and institutional  underpinnings.
On the social side, safety nets are also lacking since couantries  relied on rapid growth and
employment  to provide  social  security  for its citizens. Hence  the social costs of this crisis  will be
large, in terms of unemployment  and impact on the poor.  Despite significant gains in the
reduction  of absolute poverty, in Thailand,  and even to a larger degree in Indonesia, there is a
large segment of the population living just above the poverty line.  It is this group that is
especially  vulnerable  to the impact  of the crisis.
The East Asia crisis has highlighted  two important  sources of vulnerability  in the early
stages of financial integration: the rapid buildup of  contingent liabilities and the risks of
59excessive  reliance on short-term  borrowing. Although  their magnitude  was not known  precisely,
contingent  liabilities  were building up in the system as a result of various weakness. Together
with other fundamentals,  contingent liabilities determine the sustainability of exchange rate
regimes. At some time, the market may test the size of this liability  by putting pressure on the
exchange  rate. Vulnerability  in the financial  position-for  instance  reflected  in the ratio of short-
term debt to  reserves-will  increase the  likelihood of such attacks.  If the defense of the
exchange  rate is not credible,  large exchange  rate devaluation  and high interest rates can trigger a
downward  spiral leading  potentially  to even larger contingent  liabilities  and, at least temporarily,
to a bad equilibrium.
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